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ABSTRACT
COGNITIVE MALLEABILITY: DOES DISGUST ACT AS A “STOP” SIGNAL ON
CURRENTLY ACCESSIBLE COGNITIVE PROCESSING STYLES IN
PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL TASKS?
SEPTEMBER 2014
ELICIA CHELSEY LAIR, B.A., COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
M.A., COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Linda M. Isbell
Much of the research on feeling and thought supports the notion of a fixed relationship
between affect and cognition, specifically that particular affective experiences promote
particular ways of thinking (i.e., information processing styles). Surprisingly, little is
known about the relationship between disgust and cognition, and this dissertation sought
to rectify this omission. The recently proposed Cognitive Malleability approach (Clore, et
al., 2001; Huntsinger & Clore, 2007; Isbell, 2010; Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, 2013) calls
the fixed nature of the affect-cognition relationship into question, and instead argues that
affect confers value on whatever information processing style is currently dominant. This
new approach suggests that contrary to the current view of a fixed relationship between
affect and cognition, this relationship is instead highly malleable. This dissertation had
three primary research goals: (1) to determine whether disgust interacts with initial
cognitive processing styles, (2) to investigate if a malleable relationship between disgust
and cognition exists for both basic cognition (perceptual tasks) and upper-level cognition
(conceptual tasks), and (3) to determine if disgust and cognition interact in low-disgust
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relevant contexts (neutral stimuli, social judgments) and high-disgust relevant contexts
(disgusting stimuli, moral judgments). Results reveal that disgust acts as a stop signal on
currently dominant information processing styles to influence visual attention to
emotional stimuli (Study 2), impression formation in a social context (Study 3), and
impression formation in a moral context (Study 4). Results from Study 1, which
investigated how disgust and initial processing styles interact to influence visual attention
to neutral stimuli, were inconclusive.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Affect and cognition are entwined processes that influence a vast array of daily
experiences (Isbell & Lair, 2013). With each decade, emotion and cognition researchers
have discovered new interactive pathways between what were once thought to be distinct
processes. Although researchers now agree on the existence of a relationship between
affect and cognition, there is still debate about why this relationship exists, and if there
are limits on the extent to which these processes interact. The current research builds on
the recent Cognitive Malleability approach (Clore et al., 2001; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007;
Isbell, 2013; Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, 2013) to examine disgust, an important human
experience that is infrequently explored. In doing so, the current work expands the affect
and processing literature by systematically investigating the impact of disgust on
cognitive processing in both perceptual (Studies 1-2) and conceptual (Studies 3-4) tasks.
Further, this work extends research on disgust in the moral judgment domain (Study 4).
First, by drawing heavily on the affect-as-information approach (AAI, Schwarz &
Clore, 1983, 2007), the current research examines the relationship between disgust and
cognitive processing styles – that is, the impact of disgust on the extent to which people
process information in a global (i.e., abstract, broad, top-down, peripheral, heuristic, bigpicture) versus local (i.e., concrete, narrow, bottom-up, central, systematic, detailed)
manner (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Köhler, 1929; Navon, 1977;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). There is a broad consensus among psychological researchers
that these are two fundamental ways in which people process information (Chaiken,
1980), and these differences in processing styles exert influence on a great deal of
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processes or behaviors that are studied in social psychology (i.e., stereotyping,
persuasion, attention, perception, judgments, for a complete review see Isbell & Lair,
2013). I propose that the experience of disgust, like other affective experiences, provides
individuals with information about whatever processing style is currently accessible.
Based on recent theorizing, I expect that disgust will act as a “stop” signal leading to the
inhibition of the currently accessible cognitive processing style. Thus, when one is
processing information in a global manner, disgust is likely to inhibit this processing style
in favor of more local processing. Likewise, if local processing is dominant, disgust
should inhibit this processing style in favor of a more global processing style. The current
research empirically tests these predictions to establish whether disgust interacts with
cognitive processing styles in the way that other emotions do. If support is obtained, such
findings will provide compelling evidence for the cognitive malleability approach in a
new domain.
Second, to provide a thorough and systematic examination of how disgust impacts
cognitive processing, I tested the Cognitive Malleability framework in both perceptual
(i.e., visual) and conceptual (i.e., impression formation) tasks, as well as in tasks for
which the experience of disgust is either low or high in relevance. This later factor is
important to consider because emotional influences on judgments and processing are
sometimes limited by their relevance to the task at hand, as I will describe in more detail
in a later section. Given that disgust has not yet been widely researched, this dissertation
sheds light on the interaction between disgust and cognition in a variety of contexts.
Third, while researchers studying moral judgments have recently begun to
examine disgust, they have not yet examined this alongside cognitive information
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processing styles. Yet moral judgments reflect complex processes that typically include
an emotional component. Thus, testing and extending the cognitive malleability approach
to the role of disgust in moral judgments represents a natural and important research
direction. Moral judgments, like other judgments, can be influenced by either big-picture,
gestalt-based information, or by specific, detailed information. Recent research has begun
to examine these thinking styles in relation to moral judgments (Agerström, Björklund, &
Carlsson, 2009; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009),
specifically by focusing on how construal level (first vs. third person point of view, Trope
& Liberman, 2010) influences moral judgment, but this research has not yet examined
how affect influences these construals. This dissertation therefore bridges the theoretical
gaps between the affect, cognitive information processing styles, and morality literatures.
The first two studies examined how disgust interacts with cognition to influence
visual perception tasks and specifically tested whether feeling disgusted produces an
attentional bias for local stimuli (Studies 1 and 2) and disgusting stimuli (Study 2).
Although fear and anxiety have often been studied in relation to visual attention, disgust
has only been sparingly examined and therefore a more systematic test of disgust’s
influence on visual attention is necessary. The next set of studies (Studies 3 and 4)
examined how disgust and cognitive processing interact to influence processing in more
conceptual tasks, such as impression formation and moral judgment tasks. This set of
studies provides a comprehensive examination of how disgust and cognition interact, and
also significantly contributes to the social cognition literature. Finally, exploring this
interaction in different domains was expected to reveal that the cognitive malleability
effect, particularly when examined through disgust, is robust and generalizable.
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In what follows, I first provide some useful definitions when discussing affect and
cognitive processing, followed by evidence demonstrating the relationship between affect
and cognition. Next, I describe and provide evidence for the Cognitive Malleability
approach, and then describe the current findings on disgust and moral judgments. Finally,
I describe four studies that test if disgust interacts with cognition in a manner consistent
with the cognitive malleability approach.
Background Information
Affect, Moods, Emotions
Since psychology’s infancy, researchers have often asked, “What is an emotion?”
(James, 1890). Despite many attempts to provide clarity on this issue, this seemingly
simple question has yet to be definitively answered. Over many years, researchers have
proposed a number of definitional themes that have yielded a general, descriptive
consensus. Most readily, researchers agree that valence (i.e., positivity or negativity;
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Russell, 2003), and the duration or intensity of the
experience are central elements to any affective experience (Isbell & Burns, 2007;
Morris, 1989; see Keltner & Lerner, 2010 for a review).
This dissertation will use terms that are consistent with the current emotion
literature, and will refer to affect, moods, and emotions. Affect or an affective experience
are generalized, umbrella terms that encapsulate moods and emotions. Moods are feelings
that are low-intensity, long-lasting and do not have an accessible eliciting cause.
Emotions, on the other hand, are feelings that are more discrete than moods, and are of
shorter duration and greater intensity than moods. Unlike moods, emotions are tied to a
specific and accessible eliciting cause (Morris, 1989). In general, moods and emotions
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are those affective experiences that are brought to mind when people think of “feelings.”
My dissertation examines specifically how particular emotions interact with cognition.
Cognitive Processing
Cognition is broadly defined as mental processes that relate to comprehension and
learning, and consists of many psychological subdomains (e.g., memory, learning,
attention, categorization, language, judgment, decision-making, perception, Neisser,
1976). Cognitive processing refers to the ways in which people incorporate information
about their environment, and is an important factor to consider in social psychology, as
different processing styles tend to produce different decisions, judgments, or actions
(Chaiken, 1980; Köhler, 1929; Navon, 1977). There are two different processing styles
that dominate the literature. Broadly speaking, these processing styles have been
described with many different labels, but these labels generally overlap conceptually. For
instance, the term global processing refers to heuristic, top-down, holistic, distal, and
broadened processing, whereas the term local processing typically refers to systematic,
bottom-up, central, detailed, proximal, and narrowed processing (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken
& Trope, 1999; Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Köhler, 1929;
Navon, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Notably, these processing styles are always
active, with global processing generally considered to be the default (Bruner, 1957;
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Navon, 1977), but these styles can vary in their dominance
depending on individual and contextual factors.
Generally, people processing globally, as compared to those processing locally,
have a greater likelihood of using stereotypes, peripheral cues, or other mental “shortcuts” when making judgments or decisions, as their attention is drawn to these types of
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information (Isbell & Lair, 2013). The outcomes produced by global and local processing
are usually meaningfully different, which make these distinct processing styles one of
high interest to social psychologists (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). For example, global
processing may increase the reliance on stereotypes whereas local processing may reduce
this reliance (Bodenhausen, 1993). This dissertation focuses exclusively on how discrete
emotions interact with global and local cognitive processing styles to influence
perceptions and judgments.
The Affect as Information (AAI) Approach
The AAI approach maintains that people use affect as a source of information
when making judgments and when processing information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983;
Wyer & Carlston, 1979). According to this and many other views, affect can impact both
what we think, as well as how we think. For example, in a classic study, Schwarz and
Clore (1983) demonstrated that people judged their life satisfaction more favorably when
responding on sunny days as compared to rainy days. Although the sunshine was only
episodic, the authors argued that the positive mood associated with a sunny day became
absorbed into people’s judgments of their general life-satisfaction. Importantly, the
difference between rainy and sunny days was eliminated when people were reminded
about the weather before answering. Thus, when people were given a reason for their
heightened or depressed mood (the weather), they discounted this information when
judging their life satisfaction. This research demonstrates that people use affect as a
source of information when making judgments, except when individuals are led to
discount their affect prior to making their judgment. Such effects, which are plentiful in
the literature (Schwarz, 2002; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993, Wegener & Petty, 1997;
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Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Strack & Hannover, 1996, Isbell & Wyer, 1999; Ottati & Isbell,
1996, Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998, Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), demonstrate that affect
can influence what we think and can have a direct effect on judgments.
A separate line of work, which is the main focus of this dissertation, demonstrates
that affect may instead influence how we think, that is the extent to which we process
information in global, abstract ways versus local, concrete ones, as defined earlier. In this
way, affect directs cognitive processing (Clore, 1992; Frijda, 1988; Schwarz, 1990;
Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999). According to this view, positive moods and emotions
generally increase the likelihood of reliance on global processing (Bless, 2000, 2001;
Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994;
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Isbell, 2004; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005;
Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; Isen, 2002; Frederickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan,
2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002) because such moods signal to the perceiver that the current
environment is safe and benign (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In contrast, negative moods
and emotions tend to encourage local processing because, according to the AAI model,
such affect signals to perceivers the presence of a problem in the environment
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Isbell et al., 2005; Isbell, et al., 2013; Lambert,
Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Park & Banaji, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). When
presented with problems, a more detailed processing is typically useful in resolving them.
Thus, our affective experiences are both functional and adaptive (Darwin, 1872/1965;
Tooby & Cosmides, 2000; Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1994; Mesquita &
Frijda, 1992; Ortony & Turner, 1990).
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Notably, negative affect tends to be more varied than positive affect in the ways
that it can influence cognition. For example, anger encourages global processing, whereas
disgust and fear tend to encourage local processing (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994;
Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Park & Banaji, 2000; Parker & Isbell, 2010;
Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Wyer et al., 1999). For example, anger is associated with an
increased reliance on stereotypic information (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994),
heuristic processing (Ask & Granhag, 2007; Small & Lerner, 2008), reliance on
accessible scripts (Tiedens, 2001), and peripheral cues in persuasive argument contexts
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Therefore, anger seems
to be a unique case of how emotion interacts with cognition and demonstrates that the
informational influences of affective experiences on cognition depend on more than just
affective valence.
Although affective valence is important, emotion and cognition researchers agree
that affect is associated with a variety of cognitive constructs, such as cognitive
appraisals (e.g., pleasantness, certainty, and situational control, (Smith & Ellsworth,
1985; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), action tendencies (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, &
ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1984), and motivations (e.g., approach or avoidance, Carver &
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b) that are also useful in explaining
the relationship between affect and cognitive processing styles. Using cognitive
appraisals as an example, when people feel fear it is usually the combination of a
physiological response and the cognitive appraisals about the environment (e.g.,
uncertainty, threat, or unpleasantness) that serve to inform individuals that what they are
feeling is fear (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988). These cognitive
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appraisals and the affective experiences that they produce become intertwined to such a
degree that when a person feels fear, the cognitive constructs associated with fear are also
activated, even in a situation where these appraisals, action tendencies, or motivations
might not apply. Importantly, in these types of situations, affect activates these apprasial
constructs, which can then serve to direct cognitive processing and influence downstream
judgments (Frijda,1986; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011; Harmon-Jones, Price, & Gable,
2012; Keltner, Ellsworth, et al., 1993; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).
Although the interaction between emotion and cognition has been wellestablished (for a complete review see Isbell & Lair, 2013), a recent theoretical approach
suggests that the dedicated link between specific emotions and processing styles may not
in fact exist at all. The cognitive malleability approach contends that affect can actually
serve as a source of information about cognitive processing styles (Clore, et al., 2001;
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Hunsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2012; Huntsinger, 2012;
Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, in press; Isbell, et al., 2013). In particular, this approach
argues that some emotions and moods convey certainty (e.g., happiness, anger, Clore &
Huntsinger, 2009; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2006; Roseman, 1984) and
therefore make people more likely to use whatever cognitive processing style is currently
accessible at the moment, whereas other emotions and moods convey uncertainty (e.g.,
fear, sadness, Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984), which therefore make people less
likely to use whatever cognitive processing style is currently accessible. In the section
below, I present evidence for this new perspective of how emotion interacts with
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cognition. This dissertation further exposes the cognitive malleability approach to
rigorous empirical tests by extending the research to examine feelings of disgust.
The Cognitive Malleability Approach
The cognitive malleability approach extends the AAI model by positing that
affective cues act as a “stop” or “go” signal that can either maintain or redirect an
individual’s currently dominant cognitive processing style (Clore et al., 2001; Clore &
Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; Hunsinger et al., 2012; Huntsinger, et al., in press; Isbell, 2010;
Isbell, et al., 2013). This new theoretical approach suggests that affect provides
information about whatever cognitive processing style is currently active. Unlike existing
theoretical conceptualizations of affect and cognition, this approach explicitly states that
there is no dedicated link between certain emotions and specific processing styles.
Instead, whether happiness, fear, disgust, or any other emotion leads to either global or
local processing depends on what processing style is currently dominant. Thus, for
example, fear does not always produce a local processing style, nor does happiness
always produce a global one, but rather the relationship between affect and cognition is
highly malleable and easily changed in response to situational factors (Clore et al., 2001;
Isbell, 2010; Isbell, et al., 2013).
Direct evidence for this perspective is very recent and limited, but has already
been found in a variety of contexts and domains. For instance, research examining group
categorization processes demonstrated that happy moods led individuals to perceive
outgroup members to be more homogeneous than did sad moods; however, this was only
true when global processing was primed. When local processing was primed, the opposite
pattern emerged (Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, under review). Likewise, in research
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examining the self-concept, individuals primed with global processing who then felt
anger (vs. fear) were more likely to generate global, abstract (vs. local, concrete) selfdescriptive statements. As predicted by the cognitive malleability account, these effects
reversed under local processing conditions (Isbell, Rovenpor, & Lair, under review).
Cognitive malleability also emerges for more basic cognitive processes, such as visual
attention. For example, happy individuals primed with global processing displayed a
wider attentional scope in a subsequent flanker task (see Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) than
did individuals in sad moods. Importantly, these effects reversed when local processing
was primed (Huntsinger, 2012).
Cognitive malleability has also been demonstrated in impression formation tasks
using novel situations to prime processing, such as prompting participants to think about
their current, local psychological state (or not), or when their environment heightened
their local awareness (or not) by using a neutral but unfamiliar odor. In one study
(Hunsinger, et al., 2012), participants were asked to form an impression of “Carol”, and
were provided with categorical information about Carol (that she is either an introverted
librarian or extroverted sales representative) as well as detailed, behavioral information
about Carol’s recent experiences – information that was mixed in its implication for
introversion and extroversion. Participants who wrote about a happy (vs. sad) life
experience were more likely to rely on the categorical, global trait information when
forming impressions of Carol, but this effect reversed when they were exposed to primes
that activated local processing.
Taken together, this new evidence sheds serious doubt on the notion that there is a
dedicated link between particular emotions and particular cognitive processing styles, and
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instead suggests that this relationship is highly malleable. Furthermore, this new
approach does not contradict previous findings, but rather incorporates them into a new
understanding of how affect influences cognition. Thus previous research is simply
incomplete because it fails to manipulate processing styles. Therefore, this dissertation
extends current research by systematically manipulating both processing styles and
affect, and by examining disgust, an emotion which is thought by many researchers to
have strong, dedicated path to local processing (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Gable & HarmonJones, 2010a).
Disgust
Disgust has been defined as an intensely evocative emotion that produces a
visceral, revulsion response (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). This
reaction can be felt in response to a variety of stimuli, such as human excrement, as well
as morally wrong actions – both of which can elicit similarly disgusted reactions
(Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009).
Much of the social cognition literature has focused on how happiness, sadness,
anger, anxiety, or fear influence cognition, but disgust has rarely been examined. What
little research exists has found that disgust leads to detailed processing and narrowed
attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Wyer, et al., 1999). For example, Gable and
Harmon-Jones (2010a) found that participants completing a task that assesses global or
local focus (Navon, 1977) were faster to respond to local (vs. global) trials when
preceded by disgusting (vs. neutral) photos. These findings are explained by the cognitive
malleability approach, as such findings may simply reflect the powerful stop signal
provided by disgust on the naturally dominant global processing style (Navon, 1977).
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That is, according to the cognitive malleability view, disgust should act as a “stop”
signal, which would result in the inhibition of whatever cognitive processing style is
currently dominant. Thus, it should be possible to reverse such effects by altering the
dominant processing style from a global to a local one.
Disgust may, however, be a unique emotion that only conveys highly specific
information to an individual concerning contamination or threat. If so, it is possible that
disgust may not interact with cognitive processing styles in the manner predicted by the
cognitive malleability perspective, but may instead have a highly specific and dedicated
link to local processing. Consistent with this possibility, visual attention research has
demonstrated that disgust induces a highly specific narrowed focus of attention: one that
biases attention toward disgusting stimuli and makes it difficult to disengage attention
and focus on a neutral task (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Christianson, 1992;
Carretié, Ruiz-Padial, López-Martín, & Albert, 2011; Krusemark & Li, 2011; Nobata,
Hakoda, & Ninose, 2010). Some of this research (Krusemark & Li, 2011) suggests that
disgust produces an even stronger attentional bias than anxiety (Broadbent & Broadbent,
1988; Easterbrook, 1959; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Although I expected disgust to
act in a manner consistent with the cognitive malleability approach, this previous
research makes it plausible that disgust may not. For this reason, I carefully designed the
current studies to investigate this possibility.
Moral Judgments
Given my interest in examining disgust’s influence on cognitive processing, this
dissertation also explores a domain in which disgust has most often been studied: moral
judgments (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Scherer, 1997; Wheatley & Haidt,
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2005). Thus, the moral judgment domain is already established as highly disgust relevant,
which provides an adequate test for the cognitive malleability approach. First, I briefly
suggest ways in which processing styles might influence moral judgments, and then I
review the limited literature found at the intersections of moral judgments, cognition, and
disgust. In so doing, I argue why morality, in comparison to other domains, was chosen
as the highly relevant context within which to study the cognitive malleability perspective
for Study 4.
Moral Cognition
When people decide whether or not an action is moral, they consider information
such as whether the behavior was intentional, caused harm, could have been avoided, and
so on (Bartels, 2008). Sometimes people focus on the outcomes of actions
(Consequentialism/Utilitarianism, Pettit, 1993;), whereas other times, people focus on the
actions themselves and whether or not they meet a set of rules (Deontology, Darwall,
2003; Davis, 1993). These considerations require people to process information regarding
actions, outcomes, rule compliance, and degree of harm; all of which would necessitate
the activation of a detail-oriented cognitive processing style. For instance, the cognitive
processes associated with category inclusion (e.g., whether a desk is a piece of furniture,
Isen, 1987; Isen & Daubman, 1984) would be central when judging if actions meet a set
of rules, which shows the potential importance of cognitive processing in moral
cognition.
In support of this notion, researchers have recently begun examining the role of
construal level (distance, point-of-view, abstraction) on moral judgments, and they have
generally found that abstract thinking leads to more harsh judgments (e.g., Agerström &
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Björklund, 2009; Eyal, et al., 2008; Libby, et al., 2009). Likewise, another recent
approach situates moral judgments within a social cognitive framework (Cushman &
Young, 2011). This approach takes a social cognitive perspective on the common
philosophical and legal constructs that are often referred to in moral judgment research
(e.g., action/omission, means/side-effect, and personal/impersonal distinctions, Hauser,
Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,
1991), and provides evidence that these legal constructs are simply different labels for
social cognitive mechanisms (e.g., causal or attribution cognitions, Heider, 1958). Thus,
taken together, these new perspectives in the moral domain demonstrate that cognitive
processing is an important aspect of moral judgments, but has typically been
understudied, especially in conjunction with affect. For these reasons, the moral domain a
good candidate for investigating the cognitive malleability approach and disgust.
Moral Emotions
Many researchers contend that emotional reactions are an important aspect of
moral judgments (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Nichols &
Mallon, 2006), but there is disagreement about how these emotional reactions,
particularly disgust, contribute to moral judgment. Disgust has often been referred to as a
moral emotion (Haidt, 2003; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999), as
it reflects cognitive appraisals of purity and justice (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Yet
others have questioned if this causal, direct link between disgust and moral judgments
actually exists (David & Olatunji, 2011; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011). For many
decades, those interested in moral judgments thought that rational deliberation indicated
an inhibition of affective responses (see Haidt, 2001 for a review), but more recently,
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research has included emotion as an important aspect in moral deliberation (Cushman &
Greene, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008; see Haidt & Kesebir,
2010 for a review). Affect researchers have known for some time that affect and
cognition interact in complex ways, and it therefore seems unlikely that these processes
would not interact for moral judgments as well. Study 4 in this dissertation bridges the
current gap in the morality literature, and brings a social cognitive nd cognitive
malleability approach to moral judgments.
Although affective reactions have long been discussed and theorized by
philosophers and psychologists interested in moral judgments, this area of research only
began systematic manipulations of disgust in 2005 (Wheatley & Haidt). In this initial
study, participants were post-hypnotically primed whereby a particular word was
subliminally paired with a disgusting word, and participants then read a story that either
included or excluded the disgust-conditioned word. Participants who read the stories
including this word were harsher in their moral judgments of the character in the story, as
compared to those who read the story without the word. This finding has been
corroborated by research that shows a more nuanced influence of disgust on moral
judgments. For example, disgusted participants were more likely to make harsh moral
judgments, but this effect was not moderated by individual disgust sensitivity, meaning
greater feelings of disgust did not correspond to harsher judgments (David & Olatunji,
2011). Additionally, disgust only led to harsher judgments of purity violations (not harm
or justice violations, Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009), as well as personal (vs.
impersonal) moral action scenarios (Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012). Other inductions of
disgust, which included participants watching a disgusting video, sitting in a disgusting

!
16!

room, remembering a disgusting experience, or smelling a disgusting odor, all led
participants to judge morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral than a control group
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Therefore, it is clear that emotion has an
influence on moral judgments, but it is not yet clear if this is a direct or indirect influence
(Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009), as few studies to date have systematically
manipulated emotion, or considered the influence of processing style, which means that
more research is needed in this area.
The body of work described above demonstrates the intersections between moral
judgments, cognition, and emotion, and suggests that the moral domain is ripe for further
scrutiny regarding moral judgments, cognitive processing, and affect. Additionally, it
seems as if the moral judgment domain is confronting a familiar problem in the affect and
cognition literature, namely, that exceptions to the rules about how affect and cognition
operate with regard to moral processes keep cropping up in new research. Although
moral researchers have not yet begun to systematically investigate both cognitive
processes and emotion, I argue that the current evidence suggests that both affect and
cognition influence moral deliberation. Finally, disgust has been rarely investigated in the
social cognitive literature, but many more researchers in the moral domain have
investigated the effects of disgust. For all of these reasons, morality is the logical choice
to investigate disgust for the cognitive malleability approach in Study 4. Although not the
primary focus or contribution of this dissertation, expanding the social cognitive literature
into the moral judgment domain will be a secondary benefit of the proposed research.
Study Overview
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In the following four studies I provide a comprehensive examination of how
disgust interacts with cognitive processing styles. These studies reflect three primary
research goals. The first goal was to extend the cognitive malleability approach by
examining whether disgust and initial processing styles interact, and also whether
cognitive malleability exists in the domains of visual attention, impression formation, and
moral judgments. The second goal of this research was to examine whether disgust
influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (i.e., visual attentional, Studies 1 & 2) and
higher-level cognitive tasks (i.e., impression formation, Studies 3 & 4). The third goal of
this work was to determine if, within these cognitive domains, disgust influences
cognition in both low relevance contexts (Studies 1 & 3) and high relevance contexts
(Studies 2 & 4).
The first study establishes if incidental disgust (vs. happiness and sadness)
interacts with cognition to influence the breadth of one’s attentional scope on an
emotionally neutral visual perceptual task. The second study examines if similar effects
emerge when employing emotionally evocative stimuli to elicit affect as part of the
perceptual task. This combination of studies allows me to establish if disgust interacts
with cognitive processing, and also provides an opportunity to investigate the alternative
hypothesis that disgust causes an attentional bias.
Studies 3 and 4 turn to the impact of disgust in conceptual tasks involving
impression formation and moral assessment. Specifically, Study 3 establishes if disgust
interacts with cognitive processing to influence impression formation even when the
experience of disgust is irrelevant to the processing task at hand. Study 4 examines if
disgust and cognitive processing interact to influence moral impression formation.
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For all four studies, I hypothesized that happiness would act as a “go” signal that
would promote the currently active processing style, leading participants to show effects
that are consistent with the primed processing style. In contrast, I hypothesized that
disgust and sadness would act as “stop” signals that will inhibit the currently active
processing style leading participants to show effects that are consistent with the
alternative processing style. Furthermore, I anticipated finding this interactive effect for
tasks of both low and high relevance to disgust, as well as in both perceptual and
conceptual domains. Thus, I hypothesized that those in the global prime and happy
conditions would act similarly to those in the local prime and disgust/sad conditions, and
likewise those in the local prime and happy conditions would act similarly to those in the
global prime and disgust/sad conditions.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
This experiment sought to extend the cognitive malleability literature by
examining disgust (vs. happiness and sadness), and systematically investigating whether
incidental disgust interacts with cognitive processing styles in an affectively neutral
visual perceptual task. I hypothesized that disgust would act similarly to sadness (vs.
happiness), and would lead to a rejection of currently accessible cognitive processing
styles. Thus, when primed with global processing, I expected that disgust and sadness
would narrow attentional scope compared to happiness; however, when primed with local
processing, I expected that disgust and sadness would lead to broadened attention relative
to happiness.
This study was conducted twice, because initial data collection coincided with the
Boston Marathon bombing and the four days that authorities searched for the perpetrators
in April 2013. I not only had concerns about the participants’ affective states during that
week and how those states would likely differ from the usual baseline, but I also was
concerned that these states would interfere with one of the main goals of the study.
Indeed, I manipulated affect by having participants write about a recent life event.
Coding of the participants’ stories revealed that participants tended to write about this
attack. In fact, I found that participants who wrote about the Boston Marathon bombing
often wrote about feeling several emotions simultaneously: sadness, disgust, fear, anger,
and even optimism (about how the people of Boston responded to the attack). Although
this data is still useful from a research standpoint, I had concerns about relying on it to
test the main hypothesis in this study. For this reason, I ran the study a second time, the
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following semester. The methods for the two studies are identical and are reported in
separate sections (1A and 1B).
In this experiment, participants first completed a computerized cognitive
processing style priming task in which they were asked to focus on either local or global
elements of a letter display (Navon, 1977). Next, participants wrote a story to induce the
target emotion (happiness, sadness, disgust) before completing a flanker task (Eriksen &
Eriksen, 1974) followed by an optical illusion task, with the latter two tasks designed to
assess participants’ attentional scope. Finally, participants completed an affective
manipulation check and a short demographics questionnaire.
Method
Participants and Design
Study 1A. A total of 178 participants (80.3% female) from the psychology
participant pool were recruited for Study 1A and received 1 research credit as
compensation to be used as extra credit in their psychology course. The average age
participants reported is 19.87 years (SD = 1.38) and the sample is 75.3% Caucasian, 5.6%
African-American, 12.9% Asian, 2.2% Hispanic, 1.7% mixed race, 0.6% other race. An
additional 1.7% of the participants chose not to report their race.
Study 1B. A total of 154 participants (72.1% female) from the psychology
participant pool were recruited for Study 1B and received 1 research credit as
compensation to be used as extra credit in their psychology course. The average age
participants reported is 20.02 years (SD = 1.41) and the sample is 76.6% Caucasian, 2.6%
African-American, 11.7% Asian, 5.2% Hispanic, 1.9% mixed race. An additional 1.9%
of the participants chose not to report their race.
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Participants in Studies 1A and 1B were randomly assigned to one of six
conditions in a 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust)
experimental design.
Manipulations
Cognitive processing prime. Global and local processing styles were primed
using a letter identification task (Navon, 1977; procedure from Förster, Liberman, &
Kuschel, 2008). In this task, participants were presented with a large image of a letter
(e.g., “F”) that is comprised of a number of smaller letters (e.g., “H”s, see Figure 1).
Participants in the global condition were asked to focus on and identify the large, global
letter (e.g., “F”), whereas those in the local condition were asked to focus on and identify
the small, local letters (e.g., “H”s). Participants who scored lower than 90% accuracy on
this task were excluded from the analysis (Study 1A: n = 20; Study 1B: n = 16).
Affect manipulation. Participants were prompted to write a story about a recent
event in which they felt happy, sad, or physically disgusted (Life Event Inventory task,
Bless et al., 1996; Schnall, et al., 2008). They were asked to write about this event for 5
minutes using the instructions found in Appendix A.
Attentional Scope Measures
Flanker task. Participants completed a task in which they were instructed to
identify the central letter in a row of letters. This task presents participants with either
compatible trials in which all letters are the same letter as the central letter (e.g.,
HHHHH) or incompatible trials, in which the letters that flank the central letter are
different (e.g., SSHSS, Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).
Generally, it takes participants longer to identify incompatible trials, but previous
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research shows that this reaction time difference is more pronounced when individuals
are processing globally, because their scope of attention is widened, leading the flanking
letters to be more distracting (Navon, 1977; Huntsinger, 2012). In contrast, individuals
processing locally tend to have a more narrowed scope of attention, leading incompatible
trials to be identified more quickly, and even to have similar reaction times to the
compatible trials. After completing seven practice trials, participants completed three
blocks of 96 randomly presented trials each (with interstimulus interval = 200
milliseconds). Trials also varied as a function of flanker spacing, with only 3 millimeters
separating letters in the near trials, but 7 millimeters separating the letters in the far trials.
Participants were informed of incorrect responses through a red error message displayed
on the screen. In this task, participants were instructed to identify the central image as
quickly as possible by pressing a button on the keyboard that corresponds to the central
letter (e.g., H or S).
As is typical with reaction time data (Huntsinger, 2012), I excluded trials in which
participants made errors (4.3% of total trials) and trials in which reaction time exceeded
1,000 milliseconds (0.47% of total trials). I then examined whether there are any main
effects or interactions for the cognitive processing prime and affect manipulation for
average reaction time and error rate, and no significant effects emerged (all Fs < 1). I
then excluded participants who scored below 90% accuracy on the flanker task (Study
1A: n = 8; Study 1B: n = 2).
Reaction times for compatible and incompatible trials were compared in the
analysis to provide an estimate for attentional scope. Incompatible trials with long
reaction times relative to the reaction times for compatible trials indicate broadened
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visual attention (consistent with global processing), whereas more similar reaction times
on incompatible and compatible trials indicate narrowed visual attention (consistent with
local processing). These measures and procedures are standard when examining flanker
task reaction time data and they have been used in previous research (Huntsinger, 2012;
Rowe et al., 2007).
Ebbinghaus illusion measure. Participants were next instructed to compare two
figures for 10 seconds. These two figures are from a classic optical illusion (Ebbinguas
illusion; Weintraub, 1979), in which identical circles are either surrounded by a set of
smaller or larger circles (see Figure 2a). The mind is tricked by this illusion because the
surrounding circles make the interior circle appear either larger or smaller than they
actually are. After viewing the images for ten seconds, participants were asked to select
the relative sizes of the two central circles from a 5-option visual scale that systematically
altered the circles’ size difference (see Figure 2b). I expected that when participants
processed information globally, they would also incorporate more of these surrounding
circles into their perception of the central circles and subsequently view them as different
sizes. In contrast, I expected that those processing locally would be more likely to ignore
the surrounding circles, and instead view the two central circles as similar in size. Thus
global processers were expected to be influenced more by context compared to local
processors. I minimized the inclusion of participants who were familiar with the
Ebbinghaus illusion by asking participants at the end of the experiment if they were
familiar with the figures shown in this task (1- not familiar, 2- familiar, 3- not sure/can’t
remember). An open-ended follow up question next asked them to explain what, if
anything, they knew about the figure. Independent coders then rated these responses as
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either revealing knowledge about the illusion, or not revealing relevant knowledge (Study
1A: Kappa = .794, p < .001; Study 1B: Kappa = .812, p < .001). Thus, participants who
were coded as having knowledge of the illusion were excluded from the analyses of this
measure (Study 1A: n = 35, 19.6% of total; Study 1B: n = 18, 11.7% of total).
Affect Manipulation Check
Participants then indicated the extent to which they felt various emotions while
they were writing their story on a 7-point scale (1-Not at all, 4- Moderately, 7-Extremely;
i.e., happy, sad, disgusted, angry, afraid, anxious, bored, certain of their beliefs, cheerful,
confident, confused, depressed, distracted, grossed out, observant, queasy, sickened,
tense, thoughtful, tired, and upset). To create composite scales, happy, cheerful and
amused were averaged together (Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .886; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α
= .850), as were sad, depressed, and upset (Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .859; Study 1B:
Cronbach’s r = .870), disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out (Study 1A:
Cronbach’s α = .864; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α = .874), and anxious, tense, and afraid
(Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .776; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α = .740). I planned to compare
these composite scales to a single item measure for anger.
Finally, participants answered a short demographics questionnaire, which asked
them to report their gender, race, and age.
Results for Study 1A
Affect Manipulation Check
When examining reports of happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear while
participants were writing their stories, the expected interaction emerged between emotion
rating and affect condition, F(8,576) = 90.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .556. However, only the
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happy and sad condition participants reported affect ratings in the predicted directions.
Table 1 shows that the affect manipulations for the happy and sad conditions was
successful, however, participants in the disgust condition reported feeling equal levels of
disgust and sadness, and greater levels of anger than disgust. When I excluded the
participants who wrote about the Boston Marathon attack, the affect manipulation check
results for disgust do not improve. The wide variation in how people felt when writing
their story also made selecting statistical outliers difficult, as the outlier analysis for the
disgust condition did not show any affective responses out of the norm. Further, if I rely
on independent coder ratings of the stories to exclude people who did not write
exclusively about their randomly assigned target emotion (e.g., a story from the disgust
condition that coders rated as containing elements of disgust, anger, and sadness rather
than only disgust), the participant number dropped well below what is needed for
sufficient statistical power.
Attentional Scope
First, to determine if the presentation block or flanker trial spacing influenced
reaction times on the flanker task, I conducted a mixed analysis comparing block, flanker
spacing, trial type, affect, and processing prime. No differences emerged as a function of
block or flanker spacing (all Fs < 1), so these two factors were removed from subsequent
analyses. To determine if the processing primes and affect manipulations influenced
reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials on the flanker task,
I conducted a 2 (incompatible vs. compatible trial reaction time) x 2 (global vs. local
processing prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) repeated measure ANOVA. An overall
difference between incompatible and compatible trials emerged, F(1,144) = 615.33, p <
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.001, ηp2 = .810, and this was in the expected direction such that participants took longer
to identify the central letter in incompatible trials (M = 322.15 ms, SD = 49.58 ms) than
in compatible ones (M = 283.85 ms, SD = 43.81 ms). The reaction time difference
between trial type did not vary as a function of processing style, F(1,144) = .56, p = .46,
affect manipulation, F(2,144) = .237, p = .790, or their interaction, F(2,144) = .67, p =
.513. Additionally, no between-subjects main effects or interactions emerged (all ps >
.26). Similarly, when analyzing the results of the Ebbinghaus illusion task, no significant
main effects or interaction emerged (all ps > .30).
Results for Study 1B
Affect Manipulation Check
When examining reports of happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear while
participants were writing their stories, the expected interaction emerged between emotion
rating and affect condition, F(8,524) = 76.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .540. As the means in Table
1 show, the happy and sad manipulations were successful, but the disgust condition was
not, with participants feeling sad, disgust, and anger to a similar extent. Just as in Study
1A, the wide variation in how people felt when writing their stories also made selecting
statistical outliers difficult, as the outlier analysis for the disgust condition did not reveal
any participants responses outside of the normal range. Likewise, if I rely on independent
coder ratings of the stories to exclude people who did not write exclusively about their
target emotion (e.g., a story from the disgust condition that coders rated as having
disgust, anger, and sadness instead of only disgust), the participant number drops below
what is needed for sufficient statistical power.
Attentional Scope
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First, to determine if the presentation block or flanker trial spacing influenced
reaction times on the flanker task, I conducted a mixed analysis comparing block, flanker
spacing, trial type, affect, and processing prime. No differences emerged as a function of
block or flanker spacing (all Fs < 1), so these two factors were removed from subsequent
analyses. To determine if the processing primes and affect manipulations influenced
reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials, I conducted a 2
(incompatible vs. compatible trial reaction time) x 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x
3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) repeated measure ANOVA. There was an overall difference
between incompatible and compatible trials, F(1,131) = 419.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .762, and
this was in the expected direction such that participants took longer to identify the central
letter in incompatible trials (M = 327.71 ms, SD = 49.66 ms) than compatible trials (M =
299.01 ms, SD = 53.04 ms). The reaction time difference between trial type did not vary
as a function of processing style, F(1,131) = .17, p = .68, affect manipulation, F(2,131) =
.53, p = .59, nor their interaction, F(2,131) = 1.62, p = .20. Additionally, no betweensubjects main effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .08. These results remain the same
when examining reaction time differences across the three different presentation blocks
as a repeated measure factor, and when examining reaction time differences for near or
far flanker distance (which was randomly varied throughout the flanker task). Similarly,
when analyzing the results of the Ebbinghaus illusion task, no significant main effects or
interactions emerged (all ps > .32).
Studies 1A and 1B Combined Analysis
When analyzing the data from both studies together, the flanker task results
remain the same, with a main effect showing that incompatible trials were identified more
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slowly than compatible trials, F(1,235) = 927.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .798, but no other
effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .17. Likewise, this joint analysis produced no
changes in the Ebbinghaus illusion task responses, all ps > .19.
Given that the affect manipulation for happy and sad were relatively successful, if
I exclude the disgust conditions from the analysis, I find similar effects for the flanker
task as those reported above, with the incompatible trials identified slower than the
compatible trials, F(1,191) = 781.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .804, but no other significant effects
emerged (all ps > .07). In contrast, when analyzing the Ebbinghaus illusion measure for
attentional scope, there is a marginally significant interaction between the affect
manipulation and processing prime, F(1,161) = 3.65, p = .058, ηp2 = .022, and in the
predicted manner (see Figure 3), such that those individuals feeling happy and globally
primed were relatively more fooled by the illusion (M = 2.48, SD = 1.40), as were those
feeling sad and locally primed (M = 2.77, SD = 1.55). In contrast, those individuals
feeling happy and locally primed were relatively less fooled by the illusion (M = 2.88, SD
= 1.47), as were those feeling sad and globally primed (M = 3.24, SD = 1.51).
Discussion
The affect manipulation for the disgust condition was not successful for either
study. Comparing my procedure to the previously published procedures in which disgust
was induced through writing a story (Schnall, et al., 2008), the instructions used in
Studies 1A and 1B differed slightly from previous instructions. In previous work,
participants were asked to write about a “specific event that made them feel physically
disgusted or sick to their stomach” (emphasis mine). Due to concerns about confounding
the disgust manipulation instructions with global and local context, I avoided concrete
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language in the instructions, and instead instructed participants to write their stories using
the language provided in Appendix A. Further, I used the same writing task procedure
used in this study to manipulate disgust successfully in Study 3 (to be described later) but
the sample in Study 3 was larger, and perhaps was more robust to the individual variance
in response to the affective manipulation.
Due to unexpected problems manipulating disgust in the current studies, I cannot
draw any conclusions about the nature of disgust on neutral visual attention tasks.
Further, even when comparing happy and sad conditions, the flanker task effect did not
replicate previous research (Huntsinger, 2012). It is unclear why the flanker task did not
work as predicted, nor as previous research would suggest. One difference between my
procedure for Study 1 and the previously successful study is that I manipulated affect by
having participants write about a life event, whereas Huntsinger (2012) manipulated
affect through emotional music that played throughout the flanker task. The flanker task
is a fairly boring and tedious task, therefore, it is possible that my affective manipulation
wore off very quickly once the flanker task began, whereas Huntsinger’s simultaneous
manipulation served to prevent the flanker task from interfering with the affective
manipulation.
Additionally, even when examining a novel attentional scope measure (i.e.,
Ebbinghaus illusion), only a marginal interaction emerged. Notably, this is in the
predicted direction and supports the cognitive malleability hypothesis– but this analysis
excludes disgust. Unfortunately, despite the multiple attempts to conduct this experiment,
the fickle nature of the disgust manipulation and the temporal issues related to collecting
data during the week of the Boston Marathon attack, the results of Study 1A and Study
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1B do not contribute any potential answers to the research questions of this dissertation,
especially when compared to the remaining three studies, which do provide evidence
related to the primary research questions.
Although the results from Studies 1A and 1B are inconclusive, especially
regarding the influence of disgust and initially active processing styles on a neutral visual
attention task, Study 2 instead induces affect during the visual attention task (by using
emotional stimuli), so I did not anticipate that the same affect manipulation problems
would occur when conducting Study 2. Further, Study 2 is designed to not only examine
attentional scope, but also attentional preferences for emotional and neutral stimuli.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Study 2 investigates the extent to which feelings of disgust that are elicited during
a visual attention task (and in direct response to the task stimuli) interact to impact
attentional scope. Using a novel adaptation of the flanker task, this study also specifically
tested if disgust has a unique biasing effect on attention as compared to sadness or
happiness. In accordance with predictions derived from the cognitive malleability
perspective, I expected that integral disgust would interact with currently accessible
cognitive processing styles to influence perceptual tasks, and that disgust would have a
similar effect as sadness (vs. happiness). If no attentional bias emerged for emotional
images, I hypothesized that the standard flanker task attention effect would emerge, such
that those individuals feeling happy and primed locally, or feeling disgust or sadness and
primed globally would have smaller reaction time differences between compatible and
incompatible trials. In contrast, I hypothesized that those individuals feeling happy and
primed globally, or feeling disgust or sadness and primed locally would have slower
reaction times on incompatible trials relative to compatible trials.
The current study is also designed to test an alternative prediction. That is, given
that disgust is an intense and highly specific emotion, it is possible that in situations in
which disgust is clearly integral to the task at hand, it may serve to create a local
attentional bias regardless of whether a global or local processing style is primed. If so,
this would place the first limiting condition on the cognitive malleability hypothesis. On
the other hand, the emotional flanker task, however, also allows me to test for attentional
biases for emotional stimuli more generally (even for happy and sad stimuli), especially
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because participants simultaneously experience the affective reactions to the stimuli
tested. If emotional images are distracting, it is possible that certain emotional images
(e.g., disgust) are more distracting than others. But it is also possible that the visual
attention to emotional images can be enhanced or diminished by cognitive processing
style, and is also dependent on the emotional cue that is provided by the affective
reactions to the images themselves. Due to a dearth of previous research on this matter, I
did not have firm hypotheses about which emotional images might produce bias, other
than disgust, as evidence exists that it might draw attention (Carretié, et al., 2011). Thus,
in addition to the analysis to compare all incompatible and compatible trials, I also
examined reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials with
emotional central images, and compare those to the reaction time differences between
incompatible and compatible trials with neutral central images.
Emotional Flanker Pilot Task Study
A modified, emotional flanker task was created using the images selected by a
pretest described in Appendix B. In addition to this pretest, I piloted the emotional
flanker task to ensure that affect was influenced by the task itself, and also to examine
what influence control (in which global and local processing styles are equally primed) or
default (no processing style prime) processing styles and affect conditions would have on
reaction times for incompatible and compatible trials. Following this pilot test, I describe
the main study, which was designed to test the full set of hypotheses.
Method
Participants, Procedure, and Design
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One hundred twelve participants (70.5% female) completed the pilot study.
Participants completed a task which primed global and local processing styles equally or
no processing prime, and then completed three blocks of 96 trials each of an emotional
flanker task. After completing the emotional flanker task, they then answered various
questions about their affective state, for both “now” and “during the task”, before
answering a short demographics questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of six conditions in a 2 (equally primed vs. control processing prime) x 3 (happy vs.
sad vs. disgust flanker task) between subjects design. Those who had low accuracy on the
processing prime task were excluded from the analysis, (n = 10), as were those who
scored lower than 90% accuracy on the emotional flanker task (n = 7), leaving 95
participants’ responses for analysis. The processing prime task exclusions were equally
distributed across emotional conditions (F < 1.2), and neither the processing prime
condition (equally primed vs. no prime) nor the emotional condition influenced the
accuracy score on the flanker task (all Fs < 0.6).
Manipulations and Measures
Cognitive processing prime. Half of the participants completed a map task used
to equally prime global and local processing styles (Isbell, et al., 2013; adapted from
Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). In this task, participants are presented with a series
of state maps (Figure 4a), and are instructed to focus on both the cities listed within the
state (local information) and the shape of the states (global information). They then
answer questions about either the global or local information about the map that they just
viewed, such that sometimes they are asked information about the cities on the map (local
information, e.g., “Was Independence a city on the map?”, yes/no), whereas other times
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they are asked about the state shape (global information; Figure 4b). This task has been
used successfully in our previous research to induce a mixed processing style, where
neither a local or global processing style is dominant (Isbell, Lair, et al., under review).
The other half of the participants completed no cognitive priming task prior to the
emotional flanker task.
Emotional flanker task and affect manipulation. Similar to Study 1,
participants completed a task in which they identified a central image in a row of images.
Rather than responding to a letter display as in Study 1, participants instead saw neutral
and emotional pictures (happy, sad, disgusting) as the central images or the flanking
images (see Figure 5 for example images). Only two images were used for each block of
trials: one neutral image, and one emotional image that matched participants’ affect
condition (happy, sad, or disgust). Thus, the affect manipulation occurred by participants
viewing the emotional images displayed during the emotional flanker task. Participants
completed three blocks of 96 randomly presented trials each (with interstimulus interval
= 200 milliseconds). Given that a new emotional and a new neutral image was used for
each block, participants completed seven practice trials for each block to orient
participants to the new images. Trials also varied as a function of flanker spacing, with
approximately 2 millimeters separating images in the near trials, and approximately 6
millimeters separating the images in the far trials. Aside from using pictures as the
stimuli in the flanker task, this task used an identical flanker presentation procedure as
the one described in Study 1.
Trial exclusions for this flanker task also needed to be modified, as the standard
1,000 millisecond cut-off (used in Study 1) resulted in a large subset of the trials being
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excluded from analysis (over 5% of total trials, as compared to 0.47% of total trials in
Study 1). This is likely because letters, compared to images, are fairly easy to identify. A
new cut-off point of 1,500 milliseconds produced a trial exclusion rate similar to Study 1,
at .29%. Likewise, 4.8% of total trials were also excluded for incorrect responses (an
exclusion rate that was consistent with Study 1).
Affect Manipulation Check
Similar to Study 1, participants next indicated how they felt during the task for
various emotion items (identical to Study 1) on a 7-point response scale (1-Not at all, 4Moderately, 7-Extremely). Responses were averaged together to create composite
emotion scores: happy, cheerful, and amused (Cronbach’s α = .672); sad, depressed, and
upset, (Cronbach’s α = .804); disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out; Cronbach’s α
= .900); tense and anxious (Cronbach’s α = .809), and angry was used as a single item
measure.
Results and Discussion
Affect Manipulation Check
The emotional flanker condition influenced during the task emotion responses, as
revealed by a mixed design, F(4,178) = 2.70, p = .032,ηp2 = .057. These ratings were
generally in the right direction, such that those in happy condition were more happy (M =
2.23, SD = 1.04) than sad (M = 1.36, SD = .68; t(28) = 4.12, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.8411),
or disgusted (M = 1.27, SD = 1.04; t(28) = 4.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.811). Participants
in the sad condition, however, reported significantly more happiness during the task (M =
2.46, SD = 1.02) compared to sadness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.10; t(30) = -2.84, p = .008,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Cohen’s d =-.502), but they did report feeling more sadness than disgust (M = 1.50, SD =
.94; t(30) = 3.19, p = .003, Cohen’s d =.359). A similar pattern emerged for those in the
disgust condition, such that they felt more happiness during the task (M = 2.48, SD =
1.15) than disgust (M = 1.94, SD = 1.09 t(34) = -2.49, p = .018, Cohen’s d =-.424), but
they did report feeling more disgust than sadness (M = 1.45, SD = .64; t(34) = 2.98, p =
.005, Cohen’s d =.652). Participants reported feeling equally low on anger and anxiety
during the task, Fs < 2. None of the affective responses varied as a function of the
processing prime condition, all Fs < 1. Given that affect was only measured after the task
was over, it is likely that during that task the stimuli produced a slightly larger effect than
the one reflected here. Further, affect is often experienced at the implicit level, and the
results from both the image pretest (see Appendix B) and the emotional flanker pilot
study, taken together, suggest that the selected stimuli produce a sufficient affect
manipulation.
Emotional Flanker Reaction Times
Reaction times did not vary as a function of block, nor did they vary as a function
of flanker image spacing (near vs. far), all Fs < 1.2, and these factors were removed from
the analysis. Average trial reaction times were analyzed in a 2 (incompatible vs.
compatible trial type) x 2 (emotional vs. neutral central image) x 2 (equally primed vs. no
prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) mixed ANOVA. As expected, the cognitive
processing task that equally primed global and local styles was not significantly different
from a no prime condition, all Fs < 1, so a subsequent analysis was conducted with the
processing prime factor removed for ease of interpretation. The final analysis compared
average trial reaction times in mixed ANOVA comparing trial type (incompatible vs.
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compatible), central image type (emotional vs. neutral), and affect (happy vs. sad vs.
disgust). The analysis revealed a significant main effect for trial type, F(1,92) = 78.08, p
< .001, ηp2 = .459, a significant main effect for central image type, F(1,92) = 19.15, p <
.001, ηp2 = .172, a two-way interaction between central image type and trial type, F(1,92)
= 19.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .172, and finally a significant 3-way interaction between trial
type, central image type, and affect condition, F(2,92) = 3.98, p = .022, ηp2 = .080.
Unpacking this interaction (shown in Figure 6, see Table 2 for Ms and SDs)
reveals that all participants identified compatible trials relatively faster than incompatible
trials (happy: F(1,28) = 10.26, p = .003, ηp2 = .268; sad: F(1,30) = 25.19, p < .001, ηp2 =
.456, disgust: F(1,34) = 57.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .629). For participants in the happy
condition, despite faster identifications for trials with emotional (vs. neutral) central
images, F(1,28) = 11.54, p = .002, ηp2 = .292, their reaction time differences between
incompatible and compatible trials did not vary as a function of central image typemeaning they identified compatible (vs. incompatible) trials faster, regardless of whether
the central image was neutral or emotional, F(1,28) = .399, p =. 533. This suggests that
for happy stimuli, there might be an attentional boost for identifying happy stimuli in
general, but no simultaneous attentional bias that detracts from identifying neutral images
with happy flankers.
For participants in the sad condition, they also had faster identifications for trials
with emotional (vs. neutral) central images, F(1,30) = 5.50, p = .026, ηp2 = .155, but their
reaction time differences between incompatible and compatible trials did vary as a
function of central image type, F(1,30) = 7.58, p = .010, ηp2 = .202. The observed
reaction times indicate that participants in the sad condition took longer to identify
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incompatible trials with a neutral central image compared to trials with a sad central
image, but took nearly equal time to identify compatible trials (whether they were all
neutral or sad stimuli). This result suggests that when sad images serve as flankers around
a neutral image, there is an attentional cost to identifying the neutral image.
In contrast, for participants in the disgust condition, they did not have faster
identifications for emotional (vs. neutral) central images, F(1,34) = 3.78, p = .060, ηp2 =
.101, but their reaction times for differences between incompatible and compatible trials
varied as a function of central image type, F(1,34) = 16.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .329. Reaction
times indicate that this attentional cost for negative stimuli is even more pronounced in
the disgust condition, suggesting that although sad and disgusting images both produce
an attentional cost when trying to identify neutral images, disgust images are somewhat
more distracting from neutral stimuli than are sad images. Further, disgusting flanker
images are even distracting when the central image is also the same disgusting image (as
shown in Table 2 and Figure 6). These findings suggest that sad and disgusting stimuli
produce an attentional distraction when identifying neutral images, and that happy images
provide an attentional boost when identifying happy images.
Main Study 2
Although the emotional flanker pilot study confirmed that in a modified, integral
affect flanker task, an attentional bias exists for disgusting and sad stimuli (away from
neutral stimuli), whereas an attentional boost exists for happy stimuli, the main Study 2
examined these effects under global and local priming conditions. Therefore, Study 2
tested for evidence of cognitive malleability for attentional influences of emotional
stimuli. I hypothesized that the global processing prime would produce effects similar to
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those found in the emotional flanker pilot study, that is, the happy condition would
produce an attentional boost for happy stimuli, whereas sad and disgust conditions would
produce an attentional bias when identifying neutral stimuli in incompatible trials. I
hypothesized that these effects would reverse under local priming conditions, such that
happiness would now produce an attentional bias against identifying neutral stimuli in
incompatible trials, but that sad and disgust would boost attention when emotional
images are identified.
Study 2 also included the attentional scope Ebbinghaus illusion task used in Study
1, I hypothesized that Study 2 could produce the same effect as shown marginally in
Study 1, but because it is a neutral visual task, which included no emotional stimuli, I
considered that the implicit affective manipulation might be insufficient to reproduce the
effect found in Study 1.
Method
Participants, Design, and Procedure
A total of 207 participants from the psychology participant pool were recruited for
the study and received one research credit as compensation to apply toward extra credit in
their psychology course. All participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions
in a 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x 3 (disgust vs. happy vs. sad) experimental
design. Participants completed either the local or global Navon letter identification task to
prime processing style, identical to the one used in Study 1. Participants then completed a
modified flanker task in which they were asked to identify the central image in a display
of emotionally evocative or neutral images. After this task, participants completed the
Ebbinghuas illusion task, identical to the one used in Study 1. Finally, participants
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completed an affective manipulation check and answered a short demographic
questionnaire.
Participants were excluded for below 80% accuracy on the Navon task (n = 17),
and for below 90% accuracy on the emotional flanker task (n = 4). A multi-way
frequency revealed that these exclusions had no significant relationship to the conditions
or their interactions,χ2(8) = 1.89, p = .984. The remaining 186 participants (86% female)
reported an average age of 19.65 years, (SD = 1.72) and the participants are 74.7%
Caucasian, 2.7% African-American, 14.5% Asian, 3.8% Hispanic, 3.2% of mixed race,
0.5% of another race, and an additional 0.5% of participants chose not to report their
race.
Manipulations and Materials
Cognitive processing prime. As in Study 1, global and local processing styles
were primed using a letter identification task (Navon, 1977).
Photographic stimuli. These images were also used in the emotional flanker pilot
study (described earlier). Images were chosen from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS) and were pretested to ensure that they evoked the target emotions (see
Appendix B). These images consisted of disgusting, happy, sad, and neutral pictures (see
Appendix B and Table 9). These images were used to integrally induce mood during the
emotional flanker task (described below).
Attentional Scope Measures
Emotional flanker task and affect manipulation. The emotional flanker task
tested in the pilot study was used in this experiment. Trial exclusions followed the same
standard, such that those trials over 1,500 milliseconds were excluded (.39% of total
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trials). Likewise, 3.7% of total trials were also excluded for incorrect responses. The
overall trial exclusion rate was consistent with the rate reported for Study 1, and the
emotional flanker pilot study.
Ebbinghaus illusion measure. After the emotional flanker task, participants then
completed the identical Ebbinghaus Illusion task that was used in Study 1. Independent
coders rated participant responses about their knowledge of the illusion (Kappa = .821, p
< .001.), and I excluded 32 participants for having knowledge about the illusion.
Affect Manipulation Check
Participants next indicated how they felt during the task for a variety of emotion
items (identical to Study 1 and the emotional flanker pilot study) on a 7-point response
scale (1-Not at all, 4- Moderately, 7-Extremely). Responses were averaged together to
create composite emotion scores: happy, cheerful, and amused (Cronbach’s α = .726);
sad, depressed, and upset, (Cronbach’s α = .794); disgusted, queasy, sickened, and
grossed out; Cronbach’s α = .902); tense and anxious (Cronbach’s α = .832). The item
assessing anger was used as a single item measure.
Finally, participants completed a short demographics questionnaire that asked
them to report their age, gender, and race.
Results
Affect Manipulation Check
The affect manipulation was generally successful, with a 3 (happy, sad, and
disgust affective ratings) x 2 (global vs. local prime) x 3 (happy vs. disgust vs. sad affect
conditions) mixed ANOVA revealing an interaction between affect ratings and affect
condition, F(4,360) = 5.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .062. These ratings are similar to those
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reported in the emotional flanker pilot study, such that those in happy condition were
more happy (M = 2.63, SD = 1.28) than sad (M = 1.43, SD = .76; t(65) = 6.88, p < .001,
Cohen’s d =.870), or disgusted (M = 1.25, SD = .56; t(65) = 8.31, p < .001, Cohen’s d
=1.161). Participants in the sad condition, however, reported significantly more
happiness (M = 2.49, SD = 1.08) during the task compared to sadness (M = 1.81, SD =
.98; t(58) = 3.70, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.488), but they did report feeling more sadness
than disgust (M = 1.35, SD = .63; t(65) = 4.13, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .529). A similar
pattern emerged for those in the disgust condition, such that they felt more happiness (M
= 2.68, SD = 1.15) than disgust during the task (M = 1.90, SD = 1.23; t(60) = 4.21, p <
.001, Cohen’s d =.507), but they felt more disgust than sadness (M = 1.40, SD = .80; t(60)
= 3.48, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .456). Participants reported feeling equally low on anger
and anxiety during the task (Fs < 1.2).
Importantly, Bonferroni corrected, post-hoc simple effects reveal that those in the
sad condition reported feeling significantly more sadness than those in the happy
condition (MDiff = .38, SE = .15, p = .043), and the disgust condition (MDiff = .41, SE =
.16, p = .029). Likewise, those in the disgust condition felt more disgust than those in the
happy condition (MDiff = .64, SE = .15, p < .001), and sad condition (MDiff = .55, SE = .15,
p = .002). Those in the happy condition reported equal levels of happiness to those in the
disgust and sad conditions (omnibus F < 1, no post-hoc tests performed). These results
are consistent with the affective responses from the emotional flanker pilot study.
Visual Attention
First, I conducted an analysis that compared reaction times on all three blocks of
the emotional flanker task for block (1 vs. 2 vs. 3), flanker spacing (near vs. far), trial
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type (incompatible vs. compatible trials), central image type (emotional vs. neutral),
processing prime (global vs. local) and affect (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) in a mixed
ANOVA. As expected, reaction times on trials did not vary as a function of block or
flanker spacing (all relevant Fs < 1), so these factors were removed for a subsequent
analysis.
To determine if affect and initial processing styles influence attention to
emotional or neutral stimuli, I used the same analytical approach from the emotional
flanker pilot study, described earlier. I compared reaction times for incompatible and
compatible trials that had a neutral central image (and therefore the incompatible trial had
emotional distracting flankers) to reaction times for incompatible and compatible trials
that had an emotional central image (and therefore the incompatible trial had neutral
distracting flankers). A mixed ANOVA comparing affect (happy vs. sad vs. disgust), trial
type (incompatible vs. compatible), central image (emotional vs. neutral) and initial
processing prime (global vs. local) revealed there was a 4-way interaction between trial
type, central image type, affect, and processing prime, F(2,180) = 3.54, p = .031, ηp2 =
.038 (see Table 3a for means and Table 3b for mean differences). When global
processing was primed, the disgust condition produced the typical, expected effect, such
that disgusting central images were identified more quickly when surrounded by neutral
flankers (Figure 7a), but neutral central images were identified more slowly when
surrounded by disgusting flankers (Figure 7b). This suggests that disgusting stimuli draw
attention, which aids performance when identifying a disgusting image, but hurts
performance when identifying a neutral image.
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In contrast, the happy condition shows a reversed pattern, such that trials with a
happy central image were identified more quickly when surrounded by other happy
images (Figure 7a), and trials with neutral central images were also identified more
quickly when surrounded by happy flankers (Figure 7b). This suggests that, regardless of
whether the central image was neutral or happy, happy stimuli flankers increased
identification of the central image. In contrast to the disgust condition, there was no
increase in performance on trials in which happy images were surrounded by neutral
flankers, which suggests that happy stimuli does not draw attention away from neutral
images. The results from the global priming condition support previous research in
attention to emotional stimuli, and suggest that disgusting stimuli draw attention from
neutral cognitive tasks in a way that happy stimuli do not.
Notably, these “typical” effects found under global priming conditions, reversed
under local priming conditions. When local processing styles were primed, incompatible
trials in which disgusting stimuli surrounded a neutral central image were more quickly
identified than trials with all neutral images (Figure 7b), whereas incompatible and
compatible trials with an emotional central image were identified equally quickly (Figure
7). This suggests that under local priming conditions, disgusting stimuli surrounding a
neutral central image are not distracting, but rather aid performance, just as happy stimuli
aids performance on these trials under global priming conditions. Likewise, we also find
a reversed pattern of results for the happy condition under local priming conditions, such
that incompatible and compatible trials with a neutral central image are identified equally
quickly (Figure 7b), but the incompatible trial of a happy central image surrounded by
neutral flankers is now identified more quickly than the compatible happy image trial
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(Figure 7a). This suggests that under local priming, happy stimuli surrounding a neutral
central image are not helpful, but rather lessen performance, just as disgusting stimuli
lessened performance on these trials under global priming conditions.
The sad condition did not produce any interpretable effects, as the sad condition
differences were of a smaller magnitude than happy or disgust, and the results mimic the
disgust condition for the neutral central image flanker trials, but mimic the happy
condition for the emotional central image flanker trials.
Surprisingly, no overall flanker effect was found, such that incompatible trials did
not generally take longer to identify than compatible trials (F < 1), nor did the differences
between these trial types vary only as a function of processing prime or affect condition
(all Fs < 1.8). Additionally, analysis for the Ebbinghuas illusion task failed to replicate
results from Study 1, with no main effects or interaction emerging for processing prime
and affect condition, all Fs < 2.09. These results, taken together, suggest no evidence for
attentional scope differences between conditions, but they do suggest that affect directs
initial processing styles to influence attention to emotional and neutral stimuli.
Discussion
These results suggest that, although processing style and integral affect did not
interact to influence general attentional scope, the attentional preferences for emotional or
neutral stimuli (and subsequent biases or boosts) were dependent on the initial processing
style. I found support for the cognitive malleability hypothesis, such that participants
under global priming conditions showed the typical effects on attention, with disgusting
stimuli as flankers distracting from neutral and disgusting central images, and happy
stimuli enhancing attention for both types of central images. In contrast, this effect
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reversed under local priming conditions, such that attention for neutral central images
was enhanced for trials with disgusting flankers, but was depressed in trials with happy
flankers. These results are subtly different than the results that emerged for the emotional
flanker pilot study, which importantly demonstrates what occurs when global or local
processing styles are equally dominant. In this way, for happy and disgust conditions,
global priming in Study 2 seems to enhance the default effects found in the emotional
flanker pilot study, and local priming then reversed these globally primed effects.
Overall, the results of Study 2 suggest that attention researchers interested in
understanding affective influences on attention need to consider initial processing styles,
as attention to emotional stimuli is dependent on the type of emotion and the initial
processing style.
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted to determine whether disgust and initial
processing styles influence basic cognition, specifically visual attention. After
demonstrating that disgust interacts with initial processing styles to influence attention to
emotional and neutral stimuli in Study 2, I now turn to Studies 3 and 4, which were
conducted to determine whether disgust interacts with initial processing styles to
influence higher-level cognition, specifically social and moral impression formation.

CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
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The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether the relationship between cognitive
processing and disgust is consistent with the cognitive malleability approach in more
typical social contexts. To examine this, I used methods that have been successful at
demonstrating cognitive malleability effects in previous research, namely an impression
formation task in which global trait information is provided (i.e., extrovert vs. introvert),
along with a series of behaviors that are both consistent and inconsistent with this global
information (see Hunsinger, et al., 2013; Isbell, 2004). Consistent with this previous
research, I hypothesized that if participants processed the information in a global manner,
they would categorize and evaluate the target individual based on the initial global trait
information that was provided (an introvert or extrovert). In contrast, if participants
processed the information in a more local manner, I expected that they would analyze the
contradictory behaviors that the target performed and rely on this behavioral information
more heavily than the global trait information. I first ran this study in the laboratory,
examining the influence of affect (happy, sad, and disgusted states), global target trait
information (introvert or extrovert), and information processing prime (global or local) on
impressions of the target (Study 3A), but the results failed to replicate any previous
findings (even for happy and sad, see Appendix C for Study 3A method and results).
Due to not replicating the typical effects, I considered that it was possible that
participants at UMass were simply not reacting to the vignette as they had in previous
years. Upon speaking to our research assistants, they suggested that the target’s name
(i.e., Carol) was not as popular for their age demographic, and that the name led them to
picture someone much older than our target (who was described as 32 years old in the
vignettes). Further, nearly equal numbers of men and women participated in the previous
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published studies, whereas our sample consisted of 80.9% female participants. For this
reason, I conducted a second study (Study 3B) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers
as participants (which tend to be more evenly split in gender), and I also changed the
name of the target from Carol to Jennifer. Due to limited financial resources, I compared
only happiness and disgust, which are the focus of the primary research questions of this
dissertation.
I hypothesized that disgust would lead individuals to reject whatever cognitive
processing style is currently accessible, such that when global processing is dominant,
local processing would result, and vice versa. In contrast, I predicted that happiness
should lead individuals to maintain their currently accessible processing style. I expected
that those individuals feeling happy and globally primed or those feeling disgust and
locally primed should rely more on the global trait information and less on the individual
behaviors as a basis for their target judgments, compared to those individuals feeling
happy and locally primed or those feeling disgust and globally primed. Reliance on
global trait information should lead participants to judge the target (Jennifer) as relatively
more introverted than extroverted (when she is portrayed as an introverted librarian) and
relatively more extroverted than introverted (when she is portrayed as an extroverted
sales representative). I predicted that those focusing on local, behavioral information
would rate the target to be equally introverted and extroverted, regardless of whether she
was described as an introverted librarian or extroverted sales representative. I also
predicted that favorability judgments for the target would follow the same pattern for
extroversion ratings (as previous studies showed that participants tended to prefer the
extroverted sales representative over the introverted librarian). Thus, I predicted that
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when participants judge the target as highly extroverted, they will rate her more favorably
than when they judge the target as highly introverted.
Furthermore, I expected that participants relying on global trait information would
report using less information to form their impression of the target compared to those
relying on local information. Lastly, I predicted that participants relying on global trait
information would also report that their impression was easier to form and more clear
(because of their reliance on the global stereotype) than those relying on local, behavioral
information (due to the conflicting behavioral information present in the vignette).
Method
Participants, Design, and Procedure
Six hundred one participants were recruited through Amazon’s online Mechanical
Turk community and completed the study in exchange for $1.00. All participants were
randomly assigned to one of 8 conditions in a processing prime (global vs. local) x affect
(happy vs. disgust) x global trait information (introvert vs. extrovert) between-subjects
factorial design. Participants first completed a map task that primed either global or local
processing styles (as used in the emotional flanker pilot study), after which they wrote a
story about a recent life event in which they felt happy or physically disgusted (as used in
Study 1). They then read a vignette about the target (Jennifer), which presented global
trait information about her (i.e., that she is an introverted librarian vs. extroverted sales
representative) as well as local behavioral information (that was identical in each
vignette). After reading about the target, they then reported their overall evaluation of the
target (favorability), as well as trait ratings of the target (introversion vs. extroversion).
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Finally, participants completed an affect manipulation check and a brief demographics
questionnaire.
To ensure the quality of the responses (given that this experiment was conducted
online), I excluded participants who were in the bottom 5% of total time spent taking
survey (<10 minutes, n = 27) , as well as those who were 2.5 standard deviations (SDs)
above the mean in time spent taking the survey (>30 minutes, n = 15). I also excluded
those who answered less than 5 correct on the map task processing prime manipulation (n
= 16) and those who could not recall the target’s occupation (n = 13). A multi-way
frequency analysis including all conditions revealed there were no significant differences
in these 71 exclusions (11.8% of total sample) across conditions,χ2(10) = 4.57, p = .918.
Of the remaining 530 remaining participants (58.4% female), the average age is 37.69
years (SD = 12.87), and 82.3% are Caucasian, 3.8% are African-American, 4.9% are
Asian, 5.8% are Hispanic, 1.1% are mixed race, 1.5% are Pacific Islander/Native
American, 0.2% are another race or ethnicity, and 0.2% of participants chose not to report
their race. Participant education level was fairly high as 15.1% earned a postbaccalaureate degree, 38.3% earned a bachelor’s degree, 10.8% earned an associate’s
degree, 25.7% attended some college, 9.2% earned a high school degree or GED, and
0.9% attended some high school.
Manipulations
Processing prime. Information processing styles were primed using the same
map task as described in the emotional flanker pilot study, but this time participants were
instructed to focus on either the shape of the state (global prime) or the cities in the state
(local prime). After a practice trial, participants viewed 7 maps, each of which was
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followed by a question asking either about the shape of the state or about the cities within
the state (procedure adapted from Förster, et al., 2008; used successfully in an online
setting, Isbell, Rovenpor, et al., under review; see Figure 4).
Affect manipulation. To manipulate affect, participants wrote about a recent life
event in which they felt happy or physically disgusted (identical to the task used in
Studies 1A and 1B, see Appendix A; Bless et al., 2001; Schnall, et al., 2008). Two
independent coders rated the content of the stories, and agreed that over 90% of
participants wrote about the target emotion in their stories. The coder agreement for the
happiness content of the stories was quite high (Kappa = .970, p < .001), and the
agreement for the physically disgusting content of the stories was also adequate (Kappa =
.760, p < .001).
Global trait information. Participants read a vignette describing an unknown
person named Jennifer (see Appendix D). One version of the vignette described the daily
life of an introverted librarian and the other version described the daily life of an
extroverted salesperson. The detailed behaviors that the target performed are identical, as
both vignettes contained equal numbers of introverted and extroverted behaviors. This
vignette and adaptations of it have been successful in showing affect-induced cognitive
processing style effects in previous research (Hunsinger et al., 2012; Isbell, 2004).
General Evaluations of the Target
Feeling thermometer rating. After reading the vignette, participants rated their
feelings toward Jennifer using a feeling thermometer on which they could choose a
number between 0 to 100 to capture their impression. On this measure, ratings between 0
and 49 meant that they felt unfavorable toward Jennifer, whereas those from 51 to 100
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meant that they felt favorable toward Jennifer. A rating of 50 meant that they felt neutral
toward Jennifer.
Overall favorability. Participants also reported the extent to which they felt
favorably toward Jennifer, how positively they felt toward her, and how likable they
found her to be on three separate scales, which ranged from -5 (very
unfavorable/negative/unlikable) to +5 (very favorable/positive/likable). These three items
were averaged together to create an overall favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .913).
Target Trait Judgments
Social thermometer rating. Participants rated how much they felt Jennifer is
introverted or extroverted on a social thermometer scale, where ratings between 0 and 49
indicate that Jennifer is introverted and shy, and ratings between 51 and 100 indicate that
Jennifer is extroverted and sociable. Ratings of 50 indicate perceptions of Jennifer as
equally introverted and extroverted.
Trait ratings. Participants next rated the extent to which they thought Jennifer
exhibited extroverted traits (talkative, self-confident, extroverted, sociable, outgoing;
Cronbach’s α = .879) and introverted traits (withdrawn, shy, introverted, a loner, and
quiet; Cronbach’s α = .854) on an 11-point scale (from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10Extremely).
Impression Formation Process
Amount of information used for impression formation. Next, participants
reported how much of the information they considered when forming their impression of
Jennifer (1- Very Little Information, 2- Only about Half of the information, 3- Most of the
information, 4- Almost all of the information).
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Impression clarity. Participants also rated how difficult it was to form an
impression of Jennifer on an 11-point scale, (0-Not at all difficult, to 10- Very difficult,
reverse scored for composite), and how clear of an impression they were able to form (0Not at all clear, to 10- Very clear). These two items were averaged together to create an
impression clarity score (Cronbach’s α = .80).
Affect Manipulation Check
Participants reported the extent to which they felt particular emotions (happy,
disgusted, sad, angry, anxious, cheerful, sickened, tense, and upset) when they were
writing their story on an 11-point scale (0- Not at all, 10- Extremely). Happy and cheerful
were averaged together to create a happiness composite (Cronbach’s α = .950), disgusted
and sickened were combined to create a disgust composite (Cronbach’s α = .958), sad
and upset were combined to create a sadness composite (Cronbach’s α = .902), and tense
and anxious were combined to create an anxiety composite (Cronbach’s α = .843). Anger
remained a single item affect measure.
Results
For presentation clarity, when discussing the results from Study 3 (and also from
Study 4) I will sometimes refer to those “processing globally” (global prime + happy and
local prime + disgust conditions) and those “processing locally” (local prime + happy and
global prime + disgust conditions). Given that the cognitive malleability account only
argues for inhibition or promotion of already active processing styles, this shorthand
wording simply groups participants together by the predicted manner in which I expected
participants in these particular conditions to respond. This wording is neither meant to
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imply that there is additivity of these effects, nor that the results described definitively
infer that either global or local processing occurred.
Affect Manipulation Check
A repeated measure ANOVA comparing happy and disgusted composite
emotions revealed that the affect manipulation was successful, F(1,465) = 554.94, p <
.001, ηp2 = .516. Participants in the happy condition reported feeling more happy (M =
7.21, SD = 2.49) than disgusted (M = 0.29, SD = .97; t(253) = 38.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d
=3.660) and those in the disgust condition reported feeling more disgust (M = 5.13, SD =
3.64) than happiness (M = 2.54, SD = 2.76; t(274) = 7.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .802).
Those in the happy condition also reported significantly more happiness than anger or
anxiety (both simple effects ps < .001), likewise those in the disgust condition reported
feeling more disgust than anger or anxiety (both simple effects ps < .01).
General Evaluations of the Target
Feeling thermometer rating. Consistent with the cognitive malleability
approach, and my hypotheses, the results demonstrate that affect and information
processing primes interact to influence general evaluations of Jennifer. For the feeling
thermometer rating2, a significant three-way interaction emerged, F(1,379) = 7.71, p =
.006, ηp2 = .020. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 8, when Jennifer was described as an
extroverted sales representative, those processing globally (global + happy and local +
disgust) rated Jennifer more favorably than those processing locally (local + happy and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Note:!Due!to!the!online!survey!presentation!of!a!gray!response!box!on!a!gray!
background,!27%!of!participants!had!trouble!seeing!the!box!and!failed!to!enter!a!
response!for!the!feeling!thermometer.!I!had!intended!to!standardize!all!favorability!
judgments!and!create!a!composite!favorability!rating,!but!given!that!27%!of!
participants!did!not!respond!to!the!feeling!thermometer!item,!I!had!concerns!about!
the!interpretability!of!this!composite!measure.!!
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global + disgust; F(1,188) = 6.40, p = .012, ηp2 = .033). This pattern reversed when
Jennifer was described as an introverted librarian, such that those processing globally
(global + happy and local + disgust) rated Jennifer less favorably than those processing
locally (local + happy and global + disgust; F(1,191) = 1.78, p = .184). No other
significant main effects or interactions emerged (all ps > .29).
Overall favorability. The overall favorability score (which included favorability,
likability, and positivity judgments) showed a similar pattern of results, F(1,522) = 5.46,
p = .020, ηp2 = .010. As shown in Table 5 and Figure 9, when Jennifer was an
extroverted sales representative, those processing globally (global + happy and local +
disgust) rated Jennifer more favorably than those processing locally (local + happy and
global + disgust; F(1,257) = 4.55, p = .034, ηp2 = .017). This pattern reversed when
Jennifer was an introverted librarian, such that those processing globally (global + happy
and local + disgust) rated Jennifer less favorably than those processing locally (local +
happy and global + disgust; F(1,265) = 1.26, p = .263). No other significant main effects
or interactions emerged (all ps > .19). Both the feeling thermometer and the overall
favorability ratings produced results that support the cognitive malleability account. The
similarity of these results was expected, as the feeling thermometer and overall
favorability ratings were highly correlated, Pearson’s r(387) = .829, p < .001.
Target Trait Judgments
Social thermometer rating. Contrary to expectations, affect, processing prime,
and stereotype information did not interact to influence participants’ social thermometer
ratings; however, a main effect emerged for stereotype information, revealing that
participants rated the sales representative (M = 63.22, SD = 16.41) to be more extroverted

!
56!

than the librarian (M = 51.63, SD = 15.57; F(1,516) = 68.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .117).
Additionally, a main effect of affect emerged with those feeling disgusted rating Jennifer
as more extroverted (M = 59.28, SD = 16.97) than those feeling happy (M = 55.29, SD =
16.82; F(1,516) = 7.82 p = .005, ηp2 = .015). No other interactions or main effects
emerged, all ps > .065. As expected, the social thermometer rating was positively
correlated with trait ratings of extroversion, Pearson’s r(524) = .671, p < .001, and
negatively correlated with trait ratings of introversion, Pearson’s r(524) = -.641, p < .001.
Trait ratings. Consistent with the findings just reported, a mixed analysis of
participants’ ratings of the target on the introverted and extroverted traits as a function of
affect, processing prime, and stereotype information, failed to reveal the predicted
interaction, F(1,522) = 0, p = .984. Participants perceived Jennifer to be more extroverted
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.81) than introverted (M = 5.04, SD = 1.88, F(1,522) = 51.72, p < .001,
ηp2 = .090); however, this main effect was qualified by three two-way interactions. First,
not surprisingly, an interaction between the trait ratings and stereotype information
emerged, revealing that participants rated the librarian to be more introverted (M = 5.73,
SD = 1.70) than extroverted (M = 5.23, SD = 1.64) and the sales representative to be more
extroverted (M = 6.66, SD = 1.68) than introverted (M = 4.33, SD = 1.80; F(1,522) =
123.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .191). This finding essentially confirms that the stereotypic,
global trait information was successfully manipulated.
A second, unpredicted interaction emerged between trait ratings and information
processing prime, F(1,522) = 5.97, p = .015, ηp2 = .011, revealing that locally primed
participants judged the target to be more extroverted (M = 6.08, SD = 1.82) than
introverted (M = 4.85, SD = 1.89), whereas globally primed participants rated the target
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similarly on both extroversion (M = 5.80, SD = 1.78) and introversion (M = 5.23, SD =
1.85). Finally, the third, unpredicted two-way interaction emerged between trait ratings
and affect, F(1,522) = 4.61, p = .032, ηp2 = .009, revealing that those in the happy
condition rated the target to be only slightly more extroverted (M = 5.80, SD = 1.83) than
introverted (M = 5.21, SD = 1.88), whereas those in the disgust condition rated her to be
significantly more extroverted (M = 6.06, SD = 1.78) than introverted (M = 4.89, SD =
1.87). No other significant within-participant effects emerged3, all ps > .36. It is unclear
why these two unpredicted interactions emerged and, given the absence of a higher-order
interaction involving all of the manipulated variables, the findings are difficult to
interpret; however, these findings do not lend support to the cognitive malleability
hypothesis.
Impression Formation Process
Amount of information used for impression formation. Participants reported
differences in how much information they used when forming their impression. A
between-subjects ANOVA as a function of processing prime, affect, and global trait
information factors revealed a 2-way interaction between processing prime and affect
condition, F(1,522) = 4.11, p = .043, ηp2 = .008. These differences occurred in the
expected direction, such that those primed globally and in the happy condition reported
using relatively less information when forming their impression of Jennifer (M = 3.66,
SD = .55), compared to those in the disgust condition (M = 3.77, SD = .45; t(269) = 1.84,
p = .066). In contrast, those locally primed and in the happy condition used relatively
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!The only other significant effect in this analysis was a between-subjects interaction
between processing prime and affect, F(1,522) = 5.24, p = .023, ηp2= .010. Functionally,
this is an average between the introvert and extrovert trait ratings, which is not
interpretable.!
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more information (M = 3.78, SD = .43) than those in the disgust condition (M = 3.72, SD
= .46; t(257) = 1.012, p = .312).
Impression clarity. As expected, participant ratings of impression clarity also
reveal the predicted pattern of results. Participants’ composite impression clarity ratings
were analyzed as a function of processing prime (global vs. local), affect (happy vs.
disgust) and stereotype information (librarian vs. sales representative). As expected, this
analysis revealed a three-way interaction between these variables, F(1,520) = 5.79, p =
.016, ηp2 = .011. As shown in Table 6 and Figure 10, those who processed globally
(global + happy and local + disgust) reported greater ease and clarity in forming their
impression of Jennifer when she was an extroverted sales representative compared to
when she was an introverted librarian. Those who processed locally (local + happy and
global + disgust) reported no differences in impression clarity, regardless of whether she
was an extroverted sales representative or an introverted librarian. These results provide
support for the cognitive malleability approach.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 suggest that disgust and happiness do confer relatively
opposite types of information about currently active processing styles when forming an
impression of a target individual. I showed that target favorability judgments were
influenced by an interaction between affect, primed cognitive processing styles, and
global stereotype information. I demonstrated that disgust does influence the currently
active processing style, namely that those processing globally (participants in global +
happy and local + disgust conditions) perceived the target more favorably when portrayed
as an extroverted sales representative, but those processing locally (participants in local +
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happy and global + disgust conditions) judged the target more favorably when portrayed
as an introverted librarian. I had hypothesized that these favorability judgments would
follow ratings of extroversion, as previous research had shown that the target in the story
was more liked when she was perceived as more extroverted, but this finding did not
emerge in this study, nor were they strongly correlated (extroversion with feeling
thermometer, Pearson’s r(387) = -.208, p < .001; extroversion with overall favorability:
Pearson’s r(530) = .159, p < .001).
One explanation for these results is that these differences in favorability are due to
the fluency behind the impression formation, or also known as the ease with which
participants formed their impressions. Importantly, the vignettes provided global
information about Jennifer (extroverted sales representative vs. introverted librarian) and
then proceeded to describe Jennifer’s behavior in equally introverted and extroverted
ways. These behaviors were not ambiguous, but were a balanced mix of introverted and
extroverted behaviors. The people who were focusing on the details (those in the happy
and local or disgust and global conditions) were likely confused by her contradictory
actions. For instance, at some times in the story Jennifer was outgoing (i.e., in school),
but then at other times in the story she was shy (i.e., in the bar with Greg). In contrast,
those focusing on a general impression of Jennifer, and relying more on the global trait
information (those in the happy and global or disgust and local conditions) were less
likely to focus on these inconsistencies in her behavior. My results support this notion, as
the analysis on the amount of information considered when forming the impression show
that global processors (participants in global + happy and local + disgust conditions)
relied on relatively less information than local processors (participants in local + happy
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and global + disgust conditions). An interaction was also found on how easily and clearly
they were able to form an impression of Jennifer, which show the same pattern as the
favorability judgments. Therefore, the relative fluency or disfluency created by the
interaction between affect and initial processing style likely bled over into their overall
favorability judgment of Jennifer (as it is likely that people who are perceived as highly
erratic in their behavior are often not perceived as highly favorable).
I did not find the expected pattern of interaction for the trait rating comparisons of
introversion and extroversion. Notably, even those in the happy condition did not
replicate the previous trait rating comparisons found in previous work. This suggests to
me that it is possible that my manipulations were too subtle to influence these trait
judgments, which were measured after the favorability ratings.
Overall, Study 3B produced nearly all of the expected effects, and happiness and
disgust interacted with initial processing styles in the predicted manner, which provides
support for the cognitive malleability account in a higher-level cognitive task with low
disgust relevance.

CHAPTER 5
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STUDY 4
The purpose of this study was to examine if affect and cognitive processing styles
interact in a way consistent with the malleability approach in high disgust relevant
contexts (e.g., moral judgments). Similar to Study 3, I manipulated global trait
information about a target individual, so that I could determine whether participants
relied on global or local information when forming an impression of the target individual.
In this study, participants received global categorical information that was morally
relevant (membership in a moral or immoral group) as well as a series of morally
ambiguous behaviors that the target performed. As in Study 3, the information was varied
in this way to allow me to identify under what conditions participants rely on the global
categorical information (i.e., by processing information in a more global manner) versus
the local behavioral information (i.e., by processing information in a more local manner).
Given that cognitive processing styles have not previously been examined in moral
judgment contexts, it was an open question as to whether the effects that have been
identified in general social impression formation contexts would generalize to a more
specific and emotionally charged context, (i.e., moral judgments). For instance, it is
possible that when people make moral judgments about others, they might attempt to be
as objective as possible. If this is the case, people might avoid using categorical
information when morally judging others, and prefer judging a person based upon their
actions, instead.
For this reason, I also considered the possibility that information processing styles
(dependent on initial processing prime and affect) may influence the extent to which
individuals incorporate a person’s actions into an overall judgment of that person. In
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other words, it is possible that in moral judgments a categorical or configural thinking
style might promote a black and white view of morality (e.g., if a person’s actions are
bad, they are also a bad person). In contrast, an elemental or detailed thinking style might
promote a more nuanced, grayscale view of morality (e.g., if a person’s actions are bad,
they are not necessarily also a bad person). That is, I expected that those processing
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) would not differentiate between
Jack’s actions and Jack, as a person, whereas those processing locally (local + happy and
global + disgust conditions) would be more likely to make this differentiation between a
person and their actions. Very recent research showing that third-person construal level
(similar to abstract thinking) produces harsher moral judgments (e.g., Libby, et al., 2009),
which supports my hypothesis that moral judgments would be harsher when affect and
information processing primes interact to produce more reliance on categories (i.e.,
process information in more global manner).
In order to manipulate morally-relevant global trait information, participants
needed to learn moral stereotypes that could be applied to an individual. To avoid
confounds associated with real-life moral groups (e.g., criminals, volunteers at a soup
kitchen), this study had participants learn about fictional groups of people that differed in
their moral character. Therefore, participants first completed a group stereotype training
session to learn stereotypes about these fictional groups (pilot test described below),
before beginning the experimental manipulations. In the group stereotype training
session, participants learned about group stereotypes and were also trained to identify
members of each type of novel group. After a short distractor task, participants completed
processing style and emotional manipulations, and then read a vignette about an
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individual from either the fictitious moral or immoral group. Participants next answered
questions about their impression and reported judgments of the target individual. This
experimental design required extensive pretesting of stimulus materials and tasks prior to
the full Study 4 description, and the pretests for the impression formation vignette
(Appendix E) and group names (Appendix F) are included as appendices. The group
stereotype training task was piloted before the main Study 4 to ensure that participants
adequately learned the group stereotypes, and is described below.
Group Stereotype Pilot Study
This pilot study was conducted to establish that participants would be sufficiently
aware of the moral group stereotypes to be used in the main study, to select the final
prototypical member descriptions for use in the training portion of the experiment, and to
assess the emotional impact of the group stereotype training and distractor tasks to be
used in Study 4. The first goal of this pretest was to determine if participants implicitly
learned that one group was moral (the Vassers), one group was immoral (the Haplins)
and one group was sporty (the Watkins), as compared to explicitly reading information
about the desired qualities of group members. In this pretest, half of the participants were
only given information about prototypical group members, whereas the other half of
participants were given additional information about the group itself (e.g., what values
the group stands for). One reason I wanted to compare these two types of information, is
because for the main study, I wanted to know that participants would be able to implicitly
learn the different group stereotypes from the individual members descriptions alone, and
without an explicit description of what values the groups stand for. The second goal of
the pretest was to evaluate the perceived membership typicality of each prototypical
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group member described, so that I could eliminate the least typical member description
from the moral and immoral groups in an effort to strengthen the cohesion of the group
stereotypes for the main study. The last goal of this pretest was to establish the emotional
impact of the group stereotype training and distractor tasks, to ensure that they would not
unduly influence subsequent tasks in the main Study 4.
Method
Participants, Procedure, and Design
Participants were recruited from psychology courses at UMass Amherst in
exchange for extra credit in their courses (32 total, 78.12% female). The average age of
participants is 20.13 years (SD = 1.64). The sample consists of 56.3% Caucasian
participants, 3.1% African-American participants, 28.1% Asian participants, 6.3%
Hispanic participants, and 6.3% mixed race participants. First, participants read
information about the different groups and some of their members. After familiarizing
themselves with the three different groups, participants then completed an identification
task, in which they read a short information blurb about an individual and then selected
the group to which they thought that individual belonged. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two experimental manipulations that varied the amount of information
provided about the different groups (simple vs. elaborate).
Manipulations and Tasks
Informational manipulation. For each group description, participants were
presented with basic information and a group logo (provided to help participants to
distinguish groups from one another, see Figure 11). Initial instructions were as follows:
For the first part of this experiment we are interested in understanding how
people form impressions about different groups of people, and how they
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go about identifying group members. For this reason, we would like you to
read some information about three different fictional groups of people.
These groups are somewhat like fraternities or sororities, such that people
want to join a group to be with people similar to them in some way. After
you familiarize yourself with some typical members of each group, we
will then provide you with descriptions of some individuals and ask you to
select what group you think they belong to. For now, please read the
information provided on the following screens about the individuals in
these different group and try to form an impression of what people in this
group are typically like.
On the next screen, participants were then given general information about a group,
which read: “The following individuals are all members of a group called the
Haplins/Vassers/Watkins. They are a tight-knit, community-based group, and meet up
once a month, or more, for events. For each person in the group, a brief snapshot of his
her daily experience is provided.”
In the elaborate information condition, another sentence was added about each
group between the first and second sentences. For the immoral Haplins group the
sentence read, “This group prides itself on having members that are ambitious, are always
striving for success, and tend to believe that the end results justify the means used to get
there.” For the moral Vassers group, the sentence read, “This group prides itself on
having members that work hard, are always striving for their lives to have a greater
impact in the world, and tend to believe that the way people go about achieving a goal, is
just as important as the goal itself.” For the control and sporty Watkins group, the
sentence read, “This group prides itself on having members that are dedicated, are always
striving for a better individual or team performance, and put a high priority on personal
fitness.”
Group stereotype task. Participants then read five prototypical member
descriptions of the Haplins (immoral group) and the Vassers (moral group), and four
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prototypical member descriptions about the Watkins (the sporty control group). The
members were presented as a group, such that all members of the same group were
presented before another group was presented to the participants. Within this blocked
presentation order, the presentation order of the groups and the presentation order of the
members within the groups were randomized. All of the vignettes were between 250 and
270 words in length, and are presented in Appendix G.
Identification task. After learning the novel stereotypes about the three different
groups, participants were then given 26 short identification blurbs and were asked to
identify the group to which that individual belonged. For example, if presented with, “I
was at this festival downtown and there was a man walking along, counting his money.
He had a lot of cash in his hands and dropped a five-dollar bill. I picked it up and
returned it to him,” as the short identification blurb, they would then select the group to
which that person belonged. In this case, the described individual belonged to the
Vassers, or the moral group. Participants were given feedback about their answers, and if
incorrect, were told the group to which that person belonged. In all, participants were
randomly presented with 26 identification blurbs (see Appendix H for full list). This task
was adapted from a previously used implicit stereotype categorization procedure
(Stroessner, Haines, Sherman, & Kantrowitz, 2010).
Measures
Group-based moral judgments. Participants answered three questions about the
Vassers and Haplins groups to assess their moral judgments about those groups, which
included whether they thought the group was moral or immoral, morally right or morally
wrong, and good or bad, (all on an 11-point scale, from -5- Very immoral/morally
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wrong/bad, +5- Very moral/morally right/good, Vassers Cronbach’s α = .95, Haplins
Cronbach’s α = .97).
Prototypical member ratings. Then, participants rated each prototypical member
of the groups that were described in the group stereotype task. They were given the
identical version of the description they read about the prototypical individual (but
presented in a smaller font), and then were asked “When considering ____ as a person,
how moral or immoral does s/he seem?” (11-point scale, from -5- Very Immoral to 5Very Moral). After this item, participants were then asked, “When considering _____ as a
member of the Vassers/Haplins/Watkins, to what extent do you think s/he fits in with the
group?” (11-point scale, 0- Not at all to 10- Very Much).
Coloring Distraction Task. Participants then completed a 4-minute coloring
distraction task (to be used in Study 4). The following cover story was given to
participants:
We are interested in your visual preferences, specifically the colors and
shapes you choose to use. To assess your color and shape preferences, we
would like you to take the next 4 minutes to draw on the piece of paper
provided on the desk. The screen will automatically advance to the next
part of the experiment after 4 minutes, and a countdown clock is provided
so that you can be aware of how much time is left in the task.
Participants were given 10 crayons of varying colors and a blank piece of paper upon
which to draw.
Affect Manipulation Check. In order to assess the emotional impact of the group
stereotype, identification, and coloring tasks, participants’ affect was measured directly
after the coloring task. They were asked to consider how they were feeling “at this
moment” and to respond to a series of items, such as “To what extent do you feel
happy?” on a 7-point scale (1-Not at all, 4-Moderately, 7- Extremely). Participants were
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asked to what extent they felt happy, sad, disgusted, angry, certain of their beliefs, upset,
anxious, confident, tense, grossed out, queasy, observant, bored, tired, calm, confused,
sickened, distracted, afraid, thoughtful, and amused. The first three items (happy, sad,
and disgusted) were randomly presented as the first three questions, and the remaining
items were then randomly presented. Composite measures were created by averaging
items for key emotions relevant to this study: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α = .780),
sad and upset (Cronbach’s α = .857), disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out
(Cronbach’s α = .760), and anxious, tense, and afraid (Cronbach’s α = .748). Finally,
participants answered basic demographics questions (age, race, and gender) and one
question which asked about the difficulty of the identification task they completed earlier
in the experimental session, (1-Not at all Difficult, 7-Very Difficult).
Results
Group-Based Moral Judgment Manipulation Check
I analyzed the group-based moral judgments that participants reported for the
moral and immoral groups, in a mixed design with information condition and the
expected main effect emerged, such that participants judged the Haplins as less moral (M
= -2.93, SD = 2.63) than the Vassers (M = 4.48, SD = .88; F(1,28) = 207.02, p < .001, ηp2
= .881). Importantly, these judgments did not differ as a function of whether participants
received simple or elaborate information about the groups, and no other interactions or
main effects were significant (all Fs < 1).
Identification Task
To determine if simple or elaborate information about the groups led to greater
accuracy on the identification task, I conducted an analysis comparing accuracy on the
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task across information conditions (simple vs. elaborate). The informational condition did
not influence participant accuracy, t(1,26) = -.55, p = .585. On average, participants
correctly identified 23.86 blurbs (out of 26 total), with the elaborate group information
condition scoring slightly (but not significantly) higher in accuracy (M = 24.20 out of 26,
SD = 2.33) than the simple group information condition (M = 23.46 out of 26, SD =
4.54). Furthermore, the participants did not find the identification task very difficult (M =
2.78, SD = 1.60), nor did their difficulty ratings vary as a function of informational
condition, F(1,30) = -1.22, p = .230. This finding, taken together with the result reported
above (for group-based moral judgments) suggest that participants were able to
sufficiently learn about the different group stereotypes, regardless of whether they were
presented with additional information about the group’s values.
Prototypical Member Judgments
To determine which prototypical member description should be eliminated from
the group (for the main study), I analyzed participants’ moral and fit judgments for each
prototypical member. Participants judged the prototypical group members as
appropriately moral or immoral, depending on the group to which the prototypical
member belonged, and they also judged all members as highly typical of their group. All
means for these judgments were above 8 (out of 11) for fit with group. The prototypical
member with the lowest fit ratings for the Vassers (Patrick: M = 10.30, SD = 1.88) and
the Haplins (Nick: M = 8.17, SD = 2.18) were excluded from the group stereotype task in
the main study.
Affect Manipulation Check
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Finally, to determine if the group stereotype, identification, or distractor tasks had
a detrimental effect on affect, a repeated measures analysis comparing affective responses
revealed that the tasks did not have a significant influence on participants’ affective state.
A repeated measure ANOVA compared how participants reported feeling for four
composite affect measures (happy, sad, disgusted, and anxious) after the group
stereotype, identification, and distraction tasks. Participants reported feeling significantly
more happy than sad, disgusted, or anxious, F(3,93) = 63.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, but
these positive feelings were moderate, (MHappy = 4.48, SD = 1.13; MSad = 1.82, SD = 1.05;
MDisg = 1.36, SD = 0.64; MAnx = 2.07, SD = 1.19). Notably, such findings are consistent
with what is typically obtained when measuring baseline affect in the laboratory.
Discussion
This pretest was designed to test the materials and procedures for individuals to
learn the novel group stereotypes to be used in the main study. The results confirm that
my group stereotype training procedure is successful in producing moral and immoral
group stereotypes. Furthermore, the high accuracy rate for the identification task
indicates that group stereotype learning took place regardless of whether simple or
elaborate information was provided about the groups. Additionally, the simple group
information condition was not rated as any more difficult than the elaborate group
information condition. The individual judgments of the prototypical group members also
confirmed that all members in the groups matched the target moral group stereotype.
Likewise, participants also judged these prototypical members as having a high fit with
their group, suggesting a high level of group cohesion. Last, participants’ affective
responses indicated that if the group stereotype training, identification, and distraction
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tasks influenced mood at all, they only produced moderately positive affective responses.
Thus, combining these tasks prior to the key affect and processing style manipulations of
the main study is not likely to adversely influence the overall study goals.
Main Study 4
The primary goal of this study is to examine if affect and cognitive processing
styles interact to influence moral judgments in impression formation contexts. The moral
judgment context is one that previous research suggests is highly disgust-relevant, and
therefore I was most interested in examining the cognitive malleability account in this
stringent context. Initially, this experiment included happy, sad, and disgusting affective
conditions. I selected a sad video that had been used successfully to induce sad affective
reactions in previous studies (One True Thing, Isbell et al., 2013), but I failed to consider
that it depicts a daughter who is being investigated for helping her mother end her own
life when her terminal cancer becomes too difficult to manage- content that was
unintentionally morally charged. When I analyzed the data, the sad condition only served
to add noise to the analysis, and after reviewing the clip more carefully, I decided to
eliminate this condition because of this potential confound (for the full study description
and analyses including the sad condition see Appendix H). Given that the primary goal of
this research is to investigate whether disgust serves to direct momentarily active
cognitive processing styles in a highly relevant context, the exclusion of the sad condition
does not unduly limit the study findings or my ability to test my main hypothesis. This
exclusion, however, does eliminate the secondary goal of including a different negative
emotion for the purpose of comparison to the disgust conditions.
Method

!
72!

Participants, Procedure, and Design
Participants (n = 196) were recruited from psychology courses at UMass Amherst
and took part in this study in exchange for course extra credit points. Participants first
completed the group stereotype training (described above in the pilot study) by reading
about the group information and then completing the identification task. Next, they then
completed a distractor task where they colored for four minutes to equalize their mood
and allow their cognitive baseline to settle after the group stereotype training. After this
distractor, participants were primed with an either global or local processing style
through the map task (identical to the one used in Study 3B) and then watched a video
clip that induced either happiness or disgust. After these processing prime and affect
manipulations, participants read a story about the target individual (Jack), where global
trait information was provided (through Jack’s membership in either the moral group or
immoral group) as well as local behavioral information (which consisted of morally
ambiguous behaviors). Next, participants answered questions about the impression that
they formed of the target, including moral evaluations and general evaluations (e.g,
favorability). Finally, participants answered an affect manipulation check questionnaire
and a short demographics questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 8
conditions in an affect (happy vs. disgust) by processing prime (global vs. local) by
global trait information (moral vs. immoral stereotype) between-subjects factorial design.
Forty-seven participants were excluded from the analysis because they failed
manipulation checks. Eighteen participants were excluded for scoring less than 85%
correct on the processing style map task manipulation. I also followed existing protocols
for excluding participants with non-standard responses to affective manipulations (e.g.,
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Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Schnall, et al., 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), and
22 participants who were more than three boxplot lengths away from the average
affective responses to the videos (and therefore considered statistical outliers) were
excluded from the analysis. Finally, 17 participants were also excluded because they had
participated in the pretest of the Jack vignette (and I had no a priori method of preventing
their subsequent participation in this study). A multi-way frequency analysis showed no
relationship between the experimental conditions and exclusions from the analysis (all ps
> .05). Of the remaining 149 participants (76.5% female), the average age is 19.94 years
(SD = 1.72), and 79.9% are Caucasian, 2% are African-American, 10.7% are Asian, 4.0%
are Hispanic, 2.7% are of mixed race, and 0.7% did not report their race.
Tasks and Manipulations
Group stereotype training. Participants followed the same instructions as those
used in the pilot study described above, and then read vignettes describing four
prototypical members from the moral group (the Vassers), the immoral group (the
Haplins), and the control sporty group (the Watkins). The groups were presented as
blocks, but their presentation order and the presentation order of the individuals within
groups were both randomized.
Identification task. Next, participants completed the same identification task
from the pilot study, where they read 26 short identification blurbs, chose what group the
individual belonged to, and then received feedback about their performance on each item.
Distractor task. Participants then completed a coloring-based distraction task
(also used in the pilot study), in which they were given 10 crayons of varying colors and
a blank piece of paper upon which to draw. This task was designed to provide time to
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allow the group stereotype information settle, and also to restore the participant’s
affective and cognitive baseline prior to completing the main experimental manipulations
and tasks.
Processing style manipulation. To experimentally manipulating information
processing styles, participants were then randomly assigned to complete either the global
or local map task used in Study 3B (adapted from Förster, et al., 2008, see Figure 4).
Affect manipulation. After the processing prime manipulation, participants
watched one of two video clips to induce happiness (a scene from The Simpsons; Isbell,
McCabe, et al., 2013) or disgust (a scene from Train Spotting used in Schnall et al.,
2008).
Impression formation vignette and global trait information. Participants then
read a story about an individual, named Jack. Global information was provided about
Jack through his group membership, which was both verbally and visually described
(using a small logo for the group, see Figure 11). Jack was initially introduced as a
member of either the Vassars (moral group) or the Haplins (immoral group) and then a
story was presented about Jack in which he engaged in a series of morally ambiguous
behaviors (local behavioral information, see Appendix J) with the following instructions:
“Please read all of the information below and form an impression of the character (Jack)
in the story. After doing so, you will be asked some questions about the impression that
you formed of Jack.”
Moral Impression Formations
Person-based judgments. After reading the story about Jack, participants
answered three questions to assess their moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person,
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which included whether they thought he was moral or immoral, morally right or morally
wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very immoral/morally wrong/bad to +50 Very
moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α = .904).
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral,
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α =
.930).
Moral thermometer ratings. Participants also assessed jack on a “Moral
Thermometer”, where scores between 0 and 49 indicate that Jack is an immoral person,
or someone who usually does the wrong thing and scores between 51 and 100 indicate
that Jack is a moral person, or someone who usually does the right thing.
Target Favorability Ratings
Then, identical to the procedure in Study 3B, participants rated Jack on the feeling
thermometer. Next, participants answered the overall favorability items used in Study 3B
(judging how favorable, likable, positive Jack was). After standardizing these four items,
I averaged them to create a composite favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .937).
Target Trait Ratings
Participants rated the extent to which Jack exhibited positive (average of friendly,
sincere, trustworthy, warm, generous, honest, helpful, and conscientious; Cronbach’s α =
.893) or negative personality traits (average of deceitful, mean, hostile, cruel, cold,
arrogant, calculating, thoughtless, and selfish; Cronbach’s α = .832) on an 11-point scale
(from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-Extremely). These traits were similar to those used
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for Study 3B, but instead included moral traits, as opposed to sociability traits (which
were the focus of Study 3B).
Impression Formation Process
Amount of information used for impression formation. Also identical to Study
3B procedure, participants next answered a question asking how much information they
considered when forming their impression.
Impression clarity. Then participants answered two questions (also from Study
3B) about the clarity and ease with which they formed their impression (Cronbach’s α =
.617).
Manipulation Checks
Global trait information manipulation check. Participants were then asked two
items about Jack’s group membership, the first was a free-response answer where they
were asked to name the group that Jack belonged to, and the following item was the same
question, but with multiple-choice answers of the group names. Recall was very high,
with 95.7% (n = 220) of the final sample remembering Jack’s group membership (close
alternative spellings of group names in the free response were coded as correct).
Affect manipulation check. Next, participants were asked to indicate the extent
to which they felt a variety of emotions while they were watching the video (i.e., sad,
happy, disgusted, angry, certain of their beliefs, upset, anxious, confident, tense, grossed
out, tense, queasy, observant, bored, tired, calm, confused, sickened, distracted, afraid,
thoughtless, amused). Participants reported their responses on a 7-point scale (from 1-Not
at all, to 7-Very Much). Responses for emotion items were averaged together to create
composite emotion scores: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α = .829); sad and upset
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(Cronbach’s α = .828); disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out (Cronbach’s α =
.963); and tense, anxious, and afraid (Cronbach’s α = .793).
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. Participants then
answered three questions each about the Vassers, Haplins, and Watkins groups to assess
their moral judgments about those groups. These three items were identical to those used
in the group stereotype pilot study (described earlier), and composite items were created
from all three judgments for each group (Vassers: Cronbach’s α = .937, Haplins:
Cronbach’s α = .976, Watkins: Cronbach’s α = .941).
Finally, participants completed a basic demographics questionnaire, which asked
them to report their age, race, and gender.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Affect manipulation. Participants in the happy video condition reported feeling
significantly more happiness than those in the disgust condition, as revealed by a 2
(happy score v. disgust score) x 2 (happy video v. disgust video) x 2 (global v. local) x 2
(moral vs. immoral group stereotype) mixed ANOVA. An interaction between reported
affect and the affect condition shows that the videos were successful at manipulating
affect, F(1,141) = 583.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .805. Those in the happy condition reported
significantly more happiness (M = 4.49, SD = 1.60) than disgust (M = 1.47, SD = 0.61;
t(71) = 13.65, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.69), or sadness (M = 1.60, SD = 0.81; t(71) =
12.45, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.377 .Likewise, those in the disgust condition reported
significantly more disgust (M = 5.79, SD = 1.15) than happiness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.00;
t(76) = 20.68, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.37) and sadness (M = 2.32, SD = 1.27; t(76) =
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21.68, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.926. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that those
in the disgust condition did report feeling slightly more anger, sadness, and anxiety than
those in the happy condition, (all ps < .019). Those in both the happy and disgust
conditions reported feeling significantly more of the target emotion than anger, sadness,
or anxiety (all ps < .001).
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. The group stereotype
training was successful. A significant main effect of group type revealed responses in the
expected direction, F(2,282) = 295.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .677. Participants viewed the
moral group as more moral (M = 9.72, SD = 2.18) than the immoral group (M = 3.29, SD
= 2.25; t(148) = 19.85, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.630) and the control group (M = 7.27, SD
= 1.62; t(148) = 10.71, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.885). They also viewed the immoral group
as more immoral than the control group, t(148) = -16.41, p < .001, Cohen’s d =-1.358.
Moral Judgments
Action- versus person-based judgments. I compared participants’ judgments of
the target “as a person” to their judgments of the target’s actions. Person-based judgments
and action-based moral judgments differed overall, with participants judging the target’s
actions slightly more severely (M = -.76, SD = 1.33) than Jack as a person (M = -.41 SD =
1.56), F(1,141) = 23.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .144. Aside from this main effect, differences
between person-based and action-based judgments varied as a function of processing
style and emotional manipulation, F(1,141) = 7.35, p = .008, ηp2 = .050. As shown in
Figure 12, these results support the cognitive malleability account, as those processing
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) were more likely to incorporate
the target’s actions into their overall impression of him as a person (see Table 7). In

!
79!

contrast, those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions) were
more likely to judge the target and their actions differently, particularly by judging the
person less severely than the person’s actions. Notably, participants in the disgust
condition were not significantly more punitive in their judgments of the target or his
actions when compared to those in the happy condition (within-subjects interaction:
F(1,141) = 1.76, p = .187; between-subjects main effect: F(1,141) = .171, p = .680).
Unexpectedly, the group membership information did not influence the degree to which
the actions were incorporated into the person-based moral judgment (all relevant Fs <
1.94).
Moral thermometer ratings. Analyzing participant’s ratings of Jack on the
moral thermometer revealed a significant main effect in the expected direction for Jack’s
membership in either a moral group (M = 49.67, SD = 14.04) or an immoral group (M =
44.42, SD = 15.42), F(1,141) = 5.65, p = .019, ηp2 = .039. Moral thermometer ratings of
Jack also varied as a function of processing prime, emotional manipulation, and group
stereotype information, F(1,141) = 5.03, p = .026, ηp2 = .034. As shown in Table 8 and
Figure 13, this result supports the cognitive malleability account. Those processing
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) relied more on Jack’s group
membership information when forming their moral impression of him, as compared to
those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions). The moral
thermometer ratings were highly correlated with participants’ person-based moral
judgments (Pearson’s r(149) = .780, p < .001), as well as the action-based moral
judgments (Pearson’s r(149) = .729, p < .001).
Target Favorability Ratings

!
80!

Participants’ favorability ratings of Jack also varied as a function of affect and
processing style, F(1,149) = 5.07, p = .026, ηp2 = .035. Favorability followed the same
pattern as the person-based moral judgments of Jack. Specifically, participants feeling
happy and globally primed (M = -.18, SD = .79), and those feeling disgusted and locally
primed (M = -.12, SD = .92) rated Jack less favorably than those feeling happy and
locally primed (M = .15, SD = .81), or those feeling disgusted and globally primed (M =
.13, SD = 1.10). As shown in Figure 14, these results support the cognitive malleability
account. No other effects were significant, all ps > .066.
Target Trait Judgments
Analyzing participants’ target trait ratings on the positive and negative personality
traits, only Jack’s group membership influenced their relative judgments, F(1,141) =
6.45, p = .012, ηp2 = .044. Specifically, when Jack was a member of the immoral group,
participants’ mean endorsement of negative traits was higher (M = 4.29, SD = 1.59) than
their mean endorsement of positive traits (M = 3.57, SD = 1.54, t(72) = -2.28, p = .026,
Cohen’s d = -.267). This essentially demonstrates that the immoral group membership
information successfully manipulated beliefs about whether the target was a positive
(good) or a negative (bad) person. A different pattern emerged when Jack was a member
of the moral group, such that participants equally endorsed positive traits (M = 4.23, SD =
1.32) and negative traits (M = 3.99, SD = 1.38,; t(75) = .94, p = .35).
Impression Formation Process
Jack’s group membership significantly influenced the amount of information
participants used in forming their impressions, F(1,141) = 3.93, p = .049, ηp2 = .027, such
that participants reported using slightly more information when forming an impression
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when Jack was a member of the moral group (M = 3.37, SD = .54), as compared to when
Jack was a member of immoral group (M = 3.16, SD = .78). No other main effects or
interactions emerged, (all Fs < 2.4). Additionally, when analyzing participant’s reports of
impression clarity, no significant effects emerged (all Fs < 1.02).
Discussion
The results suggest that information processing styles influence moral
impressions through the incorporation of the actions into the overall moral judgment of
the person, such that those processing globally (global + happy and local + disgust
conditions) tend to equate people with their actions, whereas those processing locally
(local + happy and global + disgust conditions) are more likely to differentiate between a
person’s actions and their personality. Further, both the disgust and happy affect
manipulations served to direct the momentarily dominant (primed) processing style to
influence these judgments, providing support for the cognitive malleability account. One
explanation for this finding, is that perhaps processing in a more global manner promotes
categorical thinking about morality, and therefore participants processing globally use
more “black and white” criteria for moral judgment: if Jack’s actions are bad, Jack,
himself, is also judged to be bad. Local processing, in contrast, supports a more nuanced,
less categorical view of morality, whereby participants could think that Jack’s actions
were morally wrong, but could separate their judgments of his actions from their
judgment of Jack, as a person.
Interestingly, the group stereotype only seemed to interact with processing primes
and affect conditions for the moral thermometer ratings, and not judgments of Jack (as a
person) or his actions. It is possible that the moral thermometer rating captured a wider
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moral impression of Jack than did the items asking participants to morally judge Jack or
his actions, which could account for this discrepancy.
Additionally, cognitive processing styles and affect interacted similarly to
influence favorability judgments of Jack. It is unclear from this experimental design,
however, if these effects occurred independent of one another, if moral judgments
influenced favorability judgments, or vice versa. The high correlation between the moral
thermometer and the feeling thermometer (r[149] = .782, p < .001) suggests that even
though participants were instructed to rate Jack on different constructs (social vs. moral)
the thermometer ratings perhaps captured the same overall impression of Jack. The high
agreement between these two items provides support for the notion that social and moral
impression formation mechanisms work similarly to one another, and that cognitive
processing styles are one potential theoretical mechanism to examine how people form
moral judgments of others, especially when considering their actions.
Finally, previous research has shown that disgust creates more punitive moral
judgments of ambiguous behavior (Schnall et al., 2008), and this effect was only partially
replicated– but not for a global processing style, which is usually considered the default
style (Bruner, 1957). In the current study, however, it is when participants are primed
with a local processing style that I found the typical effect emerge, such that people
feeling disgusted were more likely to judge a person harshly as compared to those feeling
happiness. These results suggest that moral judgments and related decision-making tasks
might induce local processing as a natural default style. For instance, processing style
researchers argue that tasks in which people are motivated to process information in a
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detailed manner, especially decisions for which they feel accountable, are more likely to
naturally induce a local processing style (Bodenhausen, Kramer, et al., 1994).

!
84!

CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation had three primary research goals. The first goal was to extend
understanding of the cognitive malleability approach by examining whether affect
(specifically disgust) and initial processing styles interact to influence moral judgments
and attention to emotional stimuli. The second goal of this research was to examine
whether disgust influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (i.e., visual attentional) and
higher-level cognitive tasks (i.e., impression formation). The third goal of this work was
to determine if disgust influences cognition in both low relevance contexts (neutral
stimuli, social judgments) and high relevance contexts (emotional stimuli, moral
judgments).
Specific Contributions of this Dissertation
Visual attention. This dissertation provides some of the first evidence to suggest
that both positive and negative emotional stimuli can either boost or bias visual attention.
What few studies exist that examine disgust and its influence on attention have suggested
that disgusting stimuli is more distracting than fearful stimuli when completing neutral
cognitive tasks (Carretié, et al., 2011), and that disgust slows attention when attending to
non-disgusting stimuli (Krusemark & Li, 2011). Likewise, only a few researchers have
examined attentional biases for positive stimuli, but this research has generally focused
on individual differences, and found that optimistic people process happy stimuli faster
than pessimistic individuals (Segerstrom, 2001). Therefore, my research not only
provides new evidence in the emotional stimuli attentional domain, but it also introduces
the information processing context as an important moderator of how different discrete
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emotional stimuli influence attention to either emotional or neutral stimuli. Thus, my
research calls into question the notion that negatively valenced affective stimuli always
distracts attention during neutral tasks, and prompts other investigators to consider initial
processing styles when drawing conclusions about affective influences on attention.
Social impression formation. My dissertation also establishes that disgust can
influence cognition in a low disgust relevant task (i.e., social impression formation). The
social cognition literature has many examples of how affect influences cognitive
processes, and early research on this topic examined how general affective states (e.g.,
positive and negative moods) impacted cognition. Given that discrete emotions often
have eliciting causes, and often are more consciously experienced, the affect-asinformation approach suggests that people are more likely to correct for information
provided by a discrete emotion when making judgments or decisions, as opposed to
information provided by a diffuse mood state (which does not usually have a specific,
eliciting cause). Importantly, this informational correction generally only occurs when
people consciously consider their emotional state. In the last few decades, social
cognitive researchers have investigated how discrete emotional states influence cognition,
and have found that even strongly felt emotions can influence cognition (see Isbell &
Lair, 2013 for a review). However, to date, few studies have considered how disgust
influences cognition, with most of the research on disgust examining its direct influence
on judgments (i.e., what people think, not how people think). Additionally, most of the
research on disgust has been conducted in highly disgust relevant domains (ones in which
disgust is not likely to be corrected for, e.g., moral judgment). Thus, this dissertation
provides one of the first steps to understanding how disgust influences cognition, by
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demonstrating that disgust’s influence on cognition can also generalize to low relevance
tasks (just as other intensely felt emotions also generally influence cognition).
Moral Impression Formation. This dissertation also contributes to the moral
cognition literature, as it establishes that cognitive processing styles influence moral
judgments. In the last decade, there has been a surge in moral cognition research, and by
extension, moral social cognitive research. Little research, to date, has considered the role
of information processing styles in moral judgments. Instead, much of the research in
moral cognition has revolved around differences in utilitarian and deontological
judgment, and has therefore examined individual differences or situations that might
promote these particular styles of thinking (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Moore, Clark, & Kane,
2008). Only recently have researchers begun to examine the role of construal level
(distance, point-of-view, abstraction) in moral judgments, and this research has generally
found that abstract thinking leads to more punitive judgments (Agerström & Björklund,
2009; Eyal, et al., 2008; Libby, et al., 2009). Likewise, research has recently shown that
affective experiences are important drivers of moral judgments (e.g., Mendez, Anders, &
Shapira, 2005; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), and that disgust tends to produce harsher
moral judgments (e.g., Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, et al., 2008). Therefore, the
results of Study 4 contribute to the moral cognition field by providing evidence that
global and local cognitive processing styles influence moral judgment. Further, I also
provide evidence that affective influences on moral judgments (a topic of great interest in
the moral literature) are dependent on the initially active cognitive processing style,
which is a finding that prompts researchers in the moral cognition field to consider initial
cognitive processing styles within the moral context.
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Additionally, my research on disgust and moral judgment also clarifies the current
thinking regarding disgust’s influence on moral judgments, particularly the notion that
feeling physically disgusted always leads to a harsher moral judgment. The results of
Study 4 contradict this view, as the results demonstrate that both happiness and physical
disgust can lead to harsher moral judgments, but that these harsher judgments are
dependent on affect and one’s currently active processing style. As my dissertation
provides evidence on this matter for judgments of morally ambiguous behaviors, future
research should consider whether affect and initial processing styles influence judgments
for different types of moral violations (e.g., purity).
Dissertation Goals
Primary research goals. Taken together, these studies fulfill my primary
research goals, as they demonstrate support for the cognitive malleability approach in two
domains that have not been previously examined: attentional bias for emotional stimuli,
and moral judgments. My second goal for the dissertation was also fulfilled, as my
dissertation shows that disgust influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (Study 2) as
well as higher-level cognitive tasks (Studies 3 & 4). Further, in regards to my third
research goal, my dissertation demonstrates that disgust interacts with initial cognitive
processing styles in domains where disgust is of low relevance (social judgments), as
well as in areas where disgust is of high relevance (moral judgments, disgusting stimuli).
My research demonstrates that disgust acts as a stop signal on one’s currently active
processing style.
Disgust versus sadness. A secondary goal of this dissertation was to determine if
disgust produced unique cognitive effects from other negative emotions. Given that prior
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research that explored the cognitive malleability approach compared happiness and
sadness, I designed this dissertation to compare disgust to both happiness and sadness.
Unfortunately, the only study in which sadness served as a reliable comparison for
disgust was in Study 2, where sadness sometimes acted similarly to happiness, and other
times acted similarly to disgust– which does not provide enough evidence for a
conclusive understanding of how disgust might be similar to or different from sadness.
Study 1 did not produce any interpretable effects, so comparing disgust and sadness in
this study was precluded by null results. Study 3 (due to financial constraints) and Study
4 (due to the unintentional moral confound of video clip) also required elimination of the
sadness condition.
Therefore, future research should consider how disgust might be similar to or
different from other negative stimuli, particularly sadness and fear, because fear
represents more of a threat-based emotion as compared to sadness (Olatunji & Sawchuk,
2005; Russell, 1980). These two emotional comparisons to disgust could help separate
valence from threat, and determine whether valence, threat, or both, provide the
information that is conferred on initial processing styles in the cognitive malleability
approach. Furthermore, comparing different types of disgust (e.g., moral, visceral, or
contamination) will also shed much light on the type of informational cue that disgust
might confer on initial processing styles. Finally, not only does this dissertation begin to
fill the gap in the social cognitive literature regarding this topic, but it also opens the door
to future research that might investigate if people who are predisposed to feel disgust
(i.e., those with high disgust sensitivity, Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009) are differentially
impacted in a wide array of social-cognitive contexts.
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Conclusions
For decades, negative affect was generally known to narrow cognitive focus,
whereas positive affect was generally known to broaden cognitive focus. Over the years,
however, more exceptions to these general rules have emerged and researchers began the
tiresome process of attempting to fit findings into existing theoretical frameworks that
simply did not adequately describe the influence of affect on cognition. Although
emotional theories have become more nuanced in recent history, there is still a glaring
hole in this body of work, namely, systematic manipulations of cognitive processing
styles. Relying on default processing styles is no longer sufficient when attempting to
explain how emotion interacts with cognition, as this only sheds light on one half of the
interactive process. Cognitive processing is extremely flexible, and often changes due to
daily tasks and demands, which means that much of what we learn about emotion in
experiments needs to reflect this cognitive landscape. This dissertation helps extend the
cognitive malleability approach by showing that even a strongly felt emotion (e.g.,
disgust) interacts with cognition in a malleable way. The results from Studies 2, 3, and 4,
taken together, support and extend the cognitive malleability account by demonstrating
that affect interacts with initial processing styles for attention to emotional stimuli,
impression formation, and moral judgments. Further, this set of studies provides
important, novel contributions to the visual attention, social cognition, and morality
domains, and also provides a comprehensive foundation upon which to build future
investigations of the important emotion of disgust.
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Table 1. Descriptive means and standard deviations for affective ratings across
conditions.
Study 1A
Happy

Sad

Disgust

Anger

Fear

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Happy

4.55(1.29)sdaf23

1.55(.80)hdaf23

1.21(.68)hsaf23

1.36(.78)hsdf23

1.89(1.05)hsda23

Sad

1.57(.56)sdaf1

4.60(1.38)hdaf1

2.54(1.48)hsaf13

3.88(1.93)hsdf13

3.39(1.43)hsda1

Disgust

1.76(1.00)sdaf1

4.03(1.43)haf1

3.94(1.37)haf12

4.88(1.98)hsdf12

3.46(1.36)hsda1

Study 1B
Happy

Sad

Disgust

Anger

Fear

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Happy

4.60(1.29)sdaf23

1.71(.88)hda23

1.21(.52)hsf23

1.15(.51)hsf23

1.74(.92)hda23

Sad

1.62(.71)saf1

4.60(1.18)hdaf13

1.98(1.34)saf13

3.60(2.10)hsdf1

3.01(1.39)hsda1

Disgust

1.99(.91)sdaf1

3.91(1.43)hf12

4.05(1.23)hf12

4.21(1.95)hf1

3.11(1.35)hsda1

Note. Letters indicate significant paired-sample, simple-effects comparisons within
conditions (all comparisons within the same row; h = happy, s = sad, d = disgust, a =
anger, f = fear). Numbers indicate significant independent sample, simple-effects
comparisons between conditions (all comparisons within the same column; 1 =
comparisons to happy, 2 = comparisons to sad, 3 = comparisons to disgust).
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Table 2. Reaction times in milliseconds as a function of central image type, affect
condition, and trial compatibility.
Emotional Central Image
Incompatible Trial

Compatible Trial

M

SD

M

SD

Happy

276.08

64.36

267.41

61.73

Sad

270.92

71.30

265.08

72.48

Disgust

285.45

64.35

280.86

68.87

Neutral Central Image
Incompatible Trial

Compatible Trial

M

SD

M

SD

Happy

293.04

63.98

280.60

63.66

Sad

288.63

60.03

267.03

62.63

Disgust

309.26

66.88

275.27

72.85
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Table 3a. Reaction times in milliseconds as a function of central image type, affect
condition, processing prime, and trial compatibility.
Emotional Central Image
Global Prime
Incompatible
M

SD

Local Prime

Compatible
M

SD

Incompatible
M

SD

Compatible
M

SD

Happy

285.36 84.80

276.87

62.52

296.04 78.06

305.20 88.86

Sad

308.81 59.27

303.79

54.44

290.07 59.17

289.22 57.89

Disgust 286.15 70.55

292.50

65.16

297.34 61.75

295.90 60.52

Neutral Central Image
Global Prime
Incompatible
M

SD

Local Prime

Compatible
M

SD

Incompatible
M

SD

Compatible
M

SD

Happy

281.71 75.22

287.87

91.77

294.13 73.27

293.35 67.47

Sad

306.98 56.36

304.58

53.50

291.46 60.86

293.47 61.47

Disgust 296.06 73.38

291.43

64.41

294.77 55.68

301.49 58.66
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Table 3b. Reaction times differences in milliseconds (incompatible – compatible) as a
function of central image type, affect condition, and processing prime.
Emotional Central Image
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy

8.50

47.59

-9.16

29.08

Sad

5.02

20.49

0.85

18.35

Disgust

-6.35

22.17

1.44

22.19

Neutral Central Image
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy

-6.15

45.52

0.78

24.45

Sad

2.40

24.48

-2.01

25.65

Disgust

4.63

31.03

-6.72

34.55
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Table 4. Feeling thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect
manipulation, and social stereotype.
Extroverted Sales Representative
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

73.22

13.84

63.70

17.71

Disgust Story

67.27

16.75

70.12

19.12

Introverted Librarian
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

67.20

15.29

69.98

13.70

Disgust Story

69.60

15.35

66.57

15.82
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Table 5. Overall favorability ratings as a function of processing style, affect
manipulation, and social stereotype.
Extroverted Sales Representative
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

2.57

1.45

1.83

2.15

Disgust Story

1.74

1.98

2.02

2.07

Introverted Librarian
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

1.91

1.68

2.34

1.59

Disgust Story

2.12

1.91

2.06

1.87
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Table 6. Overall clarity and ease of impression formation as a function of processing
style, affect manipulation, and social stereotype.
Extroverted Sales Representative
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

5.63

3.36

4.98

3.41

Disgust Story

5.34

3.42

6.16

3.78

Introverted Librarian
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Story

4.51

3.55

5.25

3.53

Disgust Story

5.36

3.53

4.62

3.45
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Table 7. Within-subjects person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function of
processing style and emotional manipulation.
Global Processing Prime
Person Judgments

Action Judgments

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Video

-.75

1.29

-.82

.95

Disgust Video

-.25

1.73

-.82

1.60

Local Processing Prime
Person Judgments

Action Judgments

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Video

-.03

1.57

-.48

1.33

Disgust Video

-.66

1.56

-.92

1.36
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Table 8. Moral thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect, and moral
group membership.
Moral Group Jack
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

53.95

12.51

48.33

14.68

Disgust Video 48.31

14.91

48.10

14.24

Happy Video

Immoral Jack
Global Prime

Local Prime

M

SD

M

SD

36.79

12.27

49.00

11.07

Disgust Video 47.00

19.30

42.95

14.97

Happy Video
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Figure 1. Navon (1977) task stimuli, here a global letter F, with local letters H.
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(a) Ebbinghaus Illusion figures shown to participants in Studies 1 and 2

(b) Answer options presented to participants on the following screen.

Figure 2. Stimuli used for the Ebbinghaus Illusion task to measure attentional scope.
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2

Happy

Sad

3

4
Global Prime
Local Prime
Processing Prime

Figure 3. Participants’ estimates of the relative sizes of the central circles in the
Ebbinghaus illusion figures as a function of affect condition and processing prime
(reverse scaled, excluding the disgust condition (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Example of state presentation image:

(b) Global question “Which is the correct state shape?” answer options:

Figure 4. Example stimuli from cognitive processing map task prime, adapted from
Förster, Liberman, and Kuschel, 2008.
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(a) Compatible Trial (with example emotional central image)

(b) Compatible Trial (with example neutral central image)

(c) Incompatible Trial (with example emotional central image)

(d) Incompatible Flanker (with example neutral central image)

Figure 5. Emotional Flanker example trials by compatibility and central image type
(images from IAPS).
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(a) Emotional Central Image
Reac%on(Time(in(Milliseconds(

315#

Incompa<ble#Trial#

305#

Compa<ble#Trial#

295#
285#
275#
265#
255#
Happy#

Sad#
Aﬀect(Condi%on(

Disgust#

(b) Neutral Central Image
Incompa<ble#Trial#

Reac%on(Time(in(Milliseconds(

315#

Compa<ble#Trial#

305#
295#
285#
275#
265#
255#
Happy#

Sad#
Aﬀect(Condi%on(

Disgust#

Figure 6. Emotional Flanker Pilot Study reaction time as a function of trial type, affect
condition, and central image type (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Central emotional image trials (incompatible: NNENN, compatible: EEEEE)

Reac%on(Time(Diﬀerence(Score(
Faster(((((((((((( (((((((((((Faster(
Incompa%ble(((((((((((((Compa%ble((

10#

Global#

8#

Local#

6#
4#
2#
0#
C2#

Happy#

Sad#

Disgust#

C4#
C6#
C8#

Aﬀect(Condi%on(

C10#

(b) Central neutral image trials (incompatible: EENEE, compatible: NNNNN)
10#

Global#

Reac%on(Time(Diﬀerence(Score(
Faster(((((((((((( ((((((((((((((((((((Faster(
Incompa%ble(((((((((((((((((((((Compa%ble
(((

8#

Local#

6#
4#
2#
0#

C2#

Happy#

Sad#

Disgust#

C4#
C6#
C8#

C10#

Aﬀect(Condi%on(

Figure 7. Reaction time difference scores in milliseconds (incompatible– compatible) as
a function of processing prime, affect, and central image type (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative

Feeling(Thermometer(

78#
Happy#

75#

Disgust#

73#
70#
68#
65#
63#
60#
Global#Prime#
Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

(b) Introverted Librarian
78#

Feeling(Thermometer(

75#

Happy#

Disgust#

73#
70#
68#
65#
63#
60#
Global#Prime#
Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

Figure 8. Feeling thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, emotional
manipulation, and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative

Overall(Favorability(

3.0#
Happy#

Disgust#

2.5#

2.0#

1.5#
Global#Prime#
Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

(b) Introverted Librarian
3.0#
Overall(Favorability(

Happy#

Disgust#

2.5#

2.0#

1.5#
Global#Prime#
Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

Figure 9. Overall favorability as a function of processing style, emotional manipulation,
and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative

Clarity(and(Ease(of(Impression(
Forma%on(

7.0#
6.5#

Happy#

Disgust#

6.0#
5.5#
5.0#
4.5#
4.0#
Global#Prime#

Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

(b) Introverted Librarian

Clarity(and(Ease(of(Impression(
Forma%on(

7.0#
Happy#

6.5#

Disgust#

6.0#
5.5#
5.0#
4.5#
4.0#
Global#Prime#

Local#Prime#
Processing(Prime(

Figure 10. Overall clarity and ease of impression as a function of processing style, affect
manipulation, and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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(a) Moral Group Logo

(b) Immoral Group Logo

(c) Control/Sporty Group

Figure 11. The logos presented with each group description and Jack vignette.
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Processing&Primes&and&Video&Emotion&Conditions&
Global!Prime!
Happy!Video!

Local!Prime!

Disgust!Video!

Happy!Video!

Disgust!Video!

0.25!

Moral&Judgments&

0.00!
K0.25!
K0.50!
K0.75!
K1.00!

PersonKBased!Judgments!
ActionKBased!Judgments!

K1.25!

Figure 12. Person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function of processing
style and affect (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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Moral(Thermometer(Ra%ngs(

60#
Immoral#Group#

55#

Moral#Group#

50#
45#
40#
35#
30#
Happy#Video#

Disgust#Video#

Global#Processing#

Happy#Video#

Disgust#Video#

Local#Processing#

Processing(Style(and(Emo%onal(Manipula%on(Condi%ons(

Figure 13. Moral thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect, and group
stereotype information (error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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Target Favorability Ratings (standardized)

0.4
Happy

Disgust

0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
Global Prime

Local Prime
Processing Prime

Figure 14. Target favorability ratings of Jack as a function of processing prime and affect
(error bars are +/- 1 SE).
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Appendix A
LIFE EVENT INVENTORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS
The following prompt was used in Study 1 and Study 3B:
Please think about the last few months. What made you really feel
happy/sad/physically disgusted recently and continues to make you feel
happy/sad/physically disgusted even when you think about it today? Please take time
to imagine what this event was like that made you really feel happy/sad/physically
disgusted and try to relive it again in your mind’s eye. Then describe what made you
feel happy/sad/physically disgusted as vividly and in as much detail as you can.

The following questions may help you with this task: What were you feeling?
What made you feel that way? What was important for you? What lead up to that
feeling? Did that event set off some chain of thoughts or fantasies that enhanced your
feelings? What were they?

Please describe the event as vividly and in as much detail as you can. You’ll be
asked to reflect more on your story later in the experiment.

!
114!

Appendix B
STUDY 2 IMAGE SELECTION PRETEST
To create a flanker task that would integrally induce affect, emotional images
were pretested for eliciting the appropriate emotions. Participants were asked to rate a
series of different images on how well each image elicited a target emotion. From these
ratings, three images were selected for each target emotion (happy, sad, disgust, and
neutral).
Method
Participants and Design
After completing Study 1A, participants completed a map task that equally
primed global and local processing styles (procedure described in the emotional flanker
pilot study). Then participants watched a short neutral video clip about the U.S. Postal
system (to equalize mood after Study 1A). After these tasks, participants completed the
image pretest. A total of 178 participants (80.3% female) from the psychology participant
pool were recruited and received one research credit as compensation to be used as extra
credit in their psychology course. The age of the participants is 19.87 years (SD = 1.38)
and the sample is 75.3% Caucasian, 5.6% African-American, 12.9% Asian, 2.2%
Hispanic, 1.7% mixed race, 0.6% of another race. An additional 1.7% of the participants
chose not to report their race. Participants were randomly assigned to rate half of the
image set, and to either a set image presentation order or a randomized image
presentation order.
Materials and Measures
Photographic stimuli. Twenty-eight images (seven for each target emotion:
happy, sad, disgusting, and neutral) from the International Affective Picture System
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(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) were selected for pretesting. The IAPS set of
images includes approximately 700 images, all of which are rated for how pleasant and
arousing they are on a 1 (highly unpleasant/low arousal) to 8 (highly pleasant/high
arousal) scale by a large dataset (N > 10,000). The images at the extremes of the arousal
scale are quite graphic in the content, with extremely unpleasant, high arousal images
being quite violent, frightening, disgusting, and overall distressing. Likewise, those at the
other end, the extremely pleasant, high arousal images tend to be pornographic in nature.
For these reasons, the overall pleasantness and arousal ratings for the 28 images I
selected for the pretest were numerically closer to the middle of these arousal and
pleasantness scales, even though they varied in terms of pleasantness according to
whether the image evoked happiness, sadness, disgust, or a relatively neutral affect.
Image Ratings. Participants rated each image on three dimensions. First, they
were asked to rate how pleasant or unpleasant the image was on a -5 (very unpleasant) to
a +5 (very pleasant) scale. Then, on the next screen they rated the extent to which that
image made them feel the target emotion (happy, sad, disgust, or unemotional) on a 0
(Not at all) to 10 (Very Much) scale. Last, they were asked to rate the extent to which that
image was “visually interesting, or eye-catching” on a 0 (Not at all Interesting) to 10
(Very Interesting) scale. For each of these ratings, the image remained in the upper
central portion of the screen for their reference.
Results and Discussion
Participant responses for the pleasantness, target emotion evocation, and visual
interest ratings did not differ as a function of presentation order (randomized vs. set), all
ts < 1. Therefore, this condition was removed from the analysis and descriptive statistics
were examined for all images. First, I ranked the images by participants’ reports of target
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emotion evocation rating, as this was the variable of greatest importance to the pretest
(i.e., whether or not the image evoked the intended emotion). Given that these images
would be used in the emotional flanker task, the five highest-rated images for the target
emotion evocation ratings were then compared for their levels of arousal and visual
interestingness, in order to create consistency across the different emotional flanker block
presentations. Table 9 shows the results of the final 12 images that were selected for use
in the emotional flanker task.
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Table 9. Mean ratings for image pretest taken from the IAPS
Image
Happy

Target Emotion

Pleasantness

Visual Interest

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Block 1

Puppies

8.54

1.75

4.15

1.08

5.59

2.20

Block 2

Girls giggling

8.50

1.65

4.11

1.32

6.25

2.25

8.06

2.20

3.66

1.83

6.50

2.40

Older people
Block 3
biking
Disgust

Block 1

Flies on pie

8.75

2.21

-3.26

2.54

4.64

3.13

Block 2

Dirty toilet

7.80

2.87

-4.28

1.79

3.81

2.87

7.13

2.84

-3.16

1.81

3.66

3.30

Cockroaches on
Block 3
Pizza
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Table 9. Continued
Image

Target Emotion

Pleasantness

Visual Interest

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

7.12

2.61

-2.90

2.02

5.79

2.89

6.52

2.73

-2.53

2.05

5.53

2.35

Girl crying

6.48

2.75

-2.66

1.93

5.33

2.72

Block 1

A Building

7.44

2.97

0.05

1.28

6.74

2.27

Block 2

Bus profile

7.34

3.01

0.24

1.11

5.01

2.68

Block 3

Card dealer

6.76

3.11

0.12

1.61

3.48

2.83

Sad

Block 1

Boy crying

Parents at
Block 2
cemetary
Block 3
Neutral
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Appendix C
STUDY 3A
Method
Participants, Design, and Procedure
A total of 296 participants from the psychology participant pool were recruited for
the study and received 1 research credit as compensation to be applied to psychology
courses for extra credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions in a
2 (global v. local processing prime) x 3 (happy, sad, disgust) x 2 (introverted librarian v.
extroverted sales representative) experimental design.
Participants first completed a cognitive processing priming manipulation that
induced either global or local cognitive processing. They then watched videos that elicit
disgust, happiness, or sadness. Next, participants read a vignette that describes a global
trait that is later contradicted by detailed information- the purpose of which is to be able
to determine what information the participants focused on (the global information or the
detailed, local information). Participants then answered questions about the impression
they formed, including favorability ratings, trait assessments of the individual they read
about, and how clearly and easily they were able to form their impression. Then they
answered questions about their emotional reactions. This emotional assessment will
include both how they are feeling at that moment, as well as how they felt when they
were watching the video. The reason these questions are not completed directly after
watching the video is due to the possibility of correction effects that have been found
when participants merely report their current mood (Macfarland, White, & Newth, 2003).
Finally, participants will complete a demographics questionnaire and then will be
debriefed, granted their research credit, and dismissed.
!
120!

I excluded 29 participants, including those who were statistical outliers in their
responses to the video clips (n = 15). I also excluded those who answered less than 85%
correct on the Navon priming task (n = 12), and those who could not recall Carol’s job (n
= 2). A multi-way frequency analysis revealed there were no significant differences in
these 29 exclusions (10% of total sample) across conditions, χ2(18) = 8.73, p = .966. Of
the 267 remaining participants (80.9% female), the average age is 20.15 years (SD =
1.65), and the sample is 85.4% Caucasian, 2.6% African-American, 10.1% Asian, .4%
Hispanic, 1.1% Mixed race, and 0.4% of participants chose not to report their race.
Tasks and Measures
Processing prime. Global and local processing styles were primed using the same
letter identification task as in Study 1 and in the main Study 2 (Navon, 1977; procedure
from Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). Participants’ total accuracy score (out of 80)
were used to determine those who were sufficiently primed (in this case the cut-off was
85%). Those trials in which the participant took longer than 1000 ms to respond were
dropped from the accuracy count.
Affect manipulation. Participants watched one of three video clips selected to
induce happiness (a scene from The Simpsons, Isbell, McCabe, et al., 2013), sadness (a
scene from One True Thing, Isbell , McCabe, et al., 2013), or disgust, (a scene from
Train Spotting, Schnall, et al., 2008).
Global trait information. The identical procedure (as described in Study 3B)
was used to manipulate global trait information about the target, portraying the target as
either an introverted librarian or extroverted sales representative. The only difference
from Study 3B, is that the target was named Carol instead of Jennifer.
General Evaluations of the Target
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Feeling thermometer rating. Participants rated the target on a feeling
thermometer using the identical procedure from Study 3B.
Overall favorability. Identical to Study 3B, participants also judged how
favorable, likable, and positive they perceived the target to be, which were averaged
together for an overall favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .913).
Target Trait Judgments
Social thermometer rating. Participants rated Carol’s extroversion and
introversion using the social thermometer scale (using the same procedure described in
Study 3B).
Trait ratings. Next, participants rated the extent to which Carol embodied
particular personality traits on an 11-point scale (from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10Extremely). Extroverted traits were averaged together (talkative, self-confident,
extroverted, sociable, outgoing; Cronbach’s α = .863), as were introverted traits
(withdrawn, shy, introverted, a loner, and quiet; Cronbach’s α = .740).
Impression Formation Process
Amount of information used for impression formation. Identical to Study 3B,
participants reported how much of the information they considered when forming their
impression of Jennifer (1- Very Little Information, 2- Only about Half of the information,
3- Most of the information, 4- Almost all of the information).
Impression clarity. Participants next rated how difficult it was to form an
impression of Jennifer on an 11-point scale, (0-Not at all difficult, to 10- Very difficult,
reverse scored for composite), and how clear of an impression they were able to form (0Not at all clear, to 10- Very clear). These two items were averaged together to create an
impression clarity score (Cronbach’s α = .752).
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Affect Manipulation Check
Similar to the Study 3B procedure, participants then reported to what extent they
felt various emotions while they were watching the video. Responses were averaged
together to create emotion composite scores: happy and cheerful (Cronbach’s α = .839),
sad and upset (Cronbach’s α = .751), disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out
(Cronbach’s α = .792). Anger was analyzed as a single-item measure.
Results
Affect Manipulation Check
A repeated measure ANOVA comparing happy, sad, and disgusted composite
emotions revealed that the affect manipulation was successful, F(4,510) = 335.55, p <
.001, ηp2 = .725. Participants in the happy condition reported more happiness (M = 4.49,
SD = 1.39) than disgust (M = 1.66, SD = .95), and sadness (M = 1.71, SD = .97; F(2,186)
= 184.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .665). Those in the sad condition reported more sadness (M =
5.13, SD = 1.29) than happiness (M = 1.51, SD = .71), and disgust (M = 2.04, SD = 1.11;
F(2,172) = 326.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .791). Finally, those in the disgust condition reported
more disgust (M = 5.85, SD = 1.34) than happiness (M = 2.01, SD = 1.15), and sadness
(M = 2.69, SD = 1.23; F(2,170) = 207.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .709). No other interactions or
main effects emerged for the processing prime or the global trait stereotype information
(all Fs < 1).
General Evaluations of the Target
Feeling thermometer rating. The expected three-way interaction between
affect, processing prime, and stereotype failed to emerge for feeling thermometer ratings;
however two unexpected two-way interactions emerged. First, an interaction between
processing prime and stereotype information emerged, F(1,255) = 4.50, p = .035, ηp2 =
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.017. This interaction reveals that those who were globally primed rated the target
equally favorable regardless of whether she was described as an extroverted sales
representative or an introverted librarian (MExt = 67.73, SD = 16.35 v. MInt = 69.12, SD =
16.44) whereas those who were locally primed evaluated Carol more favorably when she
was described as an extroverted sales representative then an introverted librarian (MExt =
72.56, SD = 12.75 v. MInt = 65.89, SD = 15.90). A second interaction between affect and
stereotype information, F(2,255) = 3.24, p = .041, ηp2 = .025 reveals that happy and sad
participants rated Carol equally regardless of stereotype information (Happy: MExt =
66.85, SD = 18.15 v. MInt = 67.62, SD = 15.92; Sad: MExt = 69.94, SD = 11.91 v. MInt =
70.23, SD = 14.82), whereas those in the disgust condition rated Carol more favorably
when she was described as an extroverted sales representative than when she was
described as an introverted librarian (MExt = 74.18, SD = 12.77 v. MInt = 64.64, SD =
17.52).
Overall favorability. As with the feeling thermometer ratings, I did not find the
expected results for the favorability composite item. There was a 2-way interaction
between affect condition and stereotype information, F(2,255) = 3.50, p = .032, ηp2 =
.027, with those in the happy and sad condition finding the introvert more favorable than
the extrovert (Happy: MExt = 5.86, SD = 2.43 v. MInt = 6.49, SD = 2.05; Sad: MExt = 6.25,
SD = 2.17 v. MInt = 6.87, SD = 2.03) and those in the disgust condition finding the
extrovert more favorable than the introvert (MExt = 6.97.18, SD = 2.14 v. MInt = 6.04, SD
= 2.30). No other interactions or main effects emerged, (all Fs < 1.1).
Target Trait Judgments
Social thermometer rating. Affect, processing prime, and stereotype
information did not fully interact to influence participants’ social thermometer ratings,
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but there was a main effect for stereotype information, F(2,255) = 37.74, p < .001, ηp2 =
.129. This was in the expected direction, such that participants rated the sales
representative (M = 63.18, SD = 15.28) to be more extroverted than the librarian (M =
51.91, SD = 15.27). No other effects emerged for the social thermometer item.
Trait ratings. A mixed ANOVA comparing ratings of introverted and
extroverted traits found the same main effect of stereotype information, but no other
effects or interaction emerged. The interaction between trait ratings and stereotype
information was in the predicted direction, F(1,255) = 72.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .221, as
participants rated the sales representative as more extroverted (M = 6.34, SD = 1.16) than
introverted (M = 4.21, SD = 1.35), but the librarian was rated equally on extroverted (M =
5.36, SD = 1.51) and introverted traits (M = 5.31, SD = 1.39). No other effects emerged
for the trait ratings, (all Fs < 1.3).
Amount of Information Used for Impression Formation and Impression Clarity
There was an overall effect of processing prime on the amount of information
considered when making an impression, such that those in the local condition considered
slightly less information (M = 3.37, SD = .58) than those in the global condition (M =
3.53, SD = .56; F(1,255) = 4.48, p = .035, ηp2 = .017).
Participants generally found that it was easier to form an impression of the sales
representative (M = 5.10, SD = 2.20) than the librarian (M = 4.40, SD = 2.08; F(1,255) =
7.90, p = .005, ηp2 = .030). An interaction between processing prime and global trait
stereotype information emerged, F(1,255) = 4.67, p = .032, ηp2 = .018, such that those in
the global processing prime condition found Carol equally easy to form an impression of,
(MExt = 4.85, SD = 1.99 v. MInt = 4.68, SD = 2.03), but those in the local condition found
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it easier to form an impression of the sales representative (MExt = 5.38, SD = 2.40) than
the librarian (MInt = 4.13, SD = 2.11).
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Appendix D
STUDY 3 VIGNETTE
The following vignette was used to establish global traits and local behavioral
information for Jennifer in Study 3B (formerly Carol in Study 3A).
________________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
NAME: Jennifer
AGE: 32
OCCUPATION: full time librarian/sales representative
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND:
“Jennifer is a shy, introverted person who likes quiet time and leads an orderly life,
so she finds her job as a librarian to be very satisfying.”
“Jennifer is a sociable, extroverted person who likes meeting people, so she finds her
job as a sales representative to be very satisfying.”
________________________________________________________________________
Jennifer woke up, turned the alarm clock off, and crawled out of bed. After
dressing quickly, she got ready to leave. This morning, Jennifer had a doctor’s
appointment before going to work. The mist had gathered on her new Toyota and she
stopped just long enough to clean the windshield before starting off. While waiting to see
the doctor, she kept a conversation going with another patient by talking animatedly
about how much she enjoyed running and other sports. She had a real knack for
controlling conversations.
After working at her librarian/sales representative job, Jennifer got ready to jog.
She loved to run and seemed enthusiastic and cheerful even when the weather wasn’t
exactly ideal. She gave the impression of having unlimited energy. Jennifer usually kept
a busy schedule going from activity to activity and somehow she managed to remain
friendly and outgoing despite her long day at work. During her run, Jennifer didn’t
hesitate to speak to strangers, having a self-assured manner with every new face.
Two days later, Jennifer and a friend went to Happy Hour at a local bar. She
spotted Greg, a guy she really liked a lot and was interested in dating. Jennifer froze and
tried to remain unnoticed, avoiding interaction with other guys as well. Today, Greg
tried to engage Jennifer in conversation. Jennifer appeared bashful and hesitant, but did
begin to complain about how hard her job as a librarian had become. Amidst the noise of
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the band, the crowds of people and her talkative friend, Jennifer’s soft voice was hardly
even heard. Later that evening, Jennifer ran into Greg and some associates on the street
in front of her office. She remained reserved and discreet about her personal life. When
Greg asked her for a date, Jennifer looked to the ground and seemed self-conscious. She
walked away, angry with herself for not taking Greg up on his offer.
Jennifer’s course schedule was heavy even though she was going to school part
time. This week, she had entered a debate that was a prelude to her campaign for a
position on the local school board. During the debate, Jennifer was forceful with her
opinions, out-shouted her opponent, and cheered loudly along with the members of her
team when they seemed to win a point. The local politicians considered that Jennifer’s
campaign would be a success because she was ambitious and seemed confident in her
opinions. It was never really clear how these local races would turn out. Jennifer took a
few hours off from her job as a librarian/sales representative to attend classes three times
a week. As opposed to classes requiring group work and interaction with other students,
Jennifer preferred classes that allowed her to work alone. During classes she felt
inhibited and tried to think through a question completely before she would dare ask it.
This week, she was particularly upset because she was not selected to be a research
assistant for a project in which she was interested. Because Jennifer avoided him, the
professor did not know she was interested in the project. Jennifer could have used both
the experience and the money from the assistantship.
That weekend, Jennifer went to the park and daydreamed for hours. Sitting by
herself among the other people in the park- mothers and their screaming, happy kidsJennifer appeared to be deep in thought, withdrawn from the activity around her. Two
friends walked by late in the day, and that night they all went to the Brentwood
neighborhood block party. Jennifer was very entertaining that night and danced for much
of the night.
The next morning, the alarm clock went off an hour early, at 7:00. Jennifer turned
over in a groggy state of half-sleep, half-waking consciousness, then curled up to try to
recover the pleasant state of drowsy unconscious. Jennifer was not better at falling back
to sleep than the rest of us, so she got out of bed, took a shower, and prepared to start
another week at her job as a librarian/sales representative.
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Appendix E
STUDY 4 VIGNETTE PRETEST
A pretest was conducted to establish that the vignette to be used in Study 4 would
provide a description of Jack that was morally ambiguous. These vignettes followed the
same format as the Carol vignette in Study 3 and described a typical day in Jack’s life.
Three subtly different versions of the vignette were given to participants, with the goal of
selecting the most morally ambiguous, or neutral description of Jack for use in Study 4.
The first goal of this pretest was to determine if any of these descriptions of Jack
conveyed an overall immoral judgment (as this could prevent any manipulation of a
moral group membership from having an effect on judgments of Jack). A second goal of
the pretest was that I wanted participants to have a movable impression of Jack (which
could be influenced by Jack’s group membership in a moral or immoral group) so I did
not want participants to have extremely high confidence or clarity for their impressions of
Jack.
Method
Participants, Procedure, and Design
Participants were recruited from a social psychology lecture class (266 total, 73%
female). Participants were given a sheet of paper with one of the three vignettes
(randomly presented) on the front side of the page, and with the questions about Jack on
the back. Participants were randomly assigned one of three vignettes, in a one-way,
between-subjects factorial design.
Materials
Participants read one of three different vignettes about Jack (see Appendix I),
with the following instructions: “Please read all of the information below and form an
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impression of the character (Jack) in the story. After doing so, you will be asked some
questions about the impression that you formed of Jack.” On the back of the page, they
were asked questions about Jack.
Measures
Moral Impression Formations
Person-based judgments. After reading the story about Jack, participants
answered three questions to assess their moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person,
which included whether they thought he was moral or immoral, morally right or morally
wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very immoral/morally wrong/bad to +5- Very
moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α = .855).
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral,
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α =
.934).
Feeling Thermometer Rating
Next, participants rated Jack on a feeling thermometer, identical to the one used in
Studies 3 and 4.
Impression Formation Confidence
Participants then answered two questions about the impression that they formed
(Cronbach’s α = .821), one asking how clear of an impression they were able to form (0Not at all clear to 6- Very clear), and how confident they were about their impression of
Jack (0- Not at all confident to 6- Very confident).
The last item asked participants to report their gender.
Results
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Moral Impression Formations
Descriptive Confirmation of Morally Neutral Depiction of Jack. First, I
compared the moral judgments of Jack, as a person, across the different three vignettes,
which confirmed participants rated Jack as morally neutral in all three of the vignettes
(with average responses ranging from 0.75 to 1.5). This narrow range of responses
demonstrates that all three vignettes depicted Jack as relatively neutral, but also slightly
positive. Similarly, when I examined the judgments of Jack’s actions, the average
responses fell close to the scale midpoint (with average responses ranging from -0.35 to
0.56).
Person-based moral judgments. Next, I conducted a one-way, three-level
ANOVA comparing the moral judgments of Jack across the three different vignettes.
When judging how moral Jack was, as a person, a significant main-effect emerged,
F(2,262) = 6.62, p = .002, ηp2 = .048. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that participants
rated Vignettes 1 and 2 similarly to one another (M1 = 1.40, SD = 1.39 vs. M2 = 1.50, SD
= 1.49; ps > .05), but that participants viewed Jack in Vignette 3 as slightly more neutral
(M3 = 0.75, SD = 1.60) than Jack as described in Vignette 1 (p = .012), and in Vignette 2
(p = .003).
Action-based moral judgments. I conducted a one-way ANOVA for the actionbased moral judgments, and a significant main effect emerged, F(2,263) = 9.30, p < .001,
ηp2 = .066. The same patterns of differences found in the previous analysis were repeated
here, as Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that Vignettes 1 and 2 were viewed relatively
similarly, (M1 = 0.54, SD = 1.67 vs. M2 = 0.56, SD = 1.62; ps > .05), whereas Jack’s
actions in Vignette 3 (M3 = -0.35, SD = 1.51) were viewed as less moral than in Vignette
1 (p = .001) and in Vignette 2 (p = .001).
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Feeling thermometer rating
A similar pattern of results emerged for ratings of Jack’s favorability from the
feeling thermometer item, F(2,262) = 5.31, p = .006, ηp2 = .039. Bonferroni post-hoc
tests revealed that Jack in Vignettes 1 and 2 were viewed relatively similarly, (M1 =
61.55, SD = 16.13 vs. M2 = 63.78, SD = 17.12; ps > .05), whereas Jack in Vignette 3 (M3
= 55.91, SD = 16.51) was viewed as slightly (but not significantly) less favorable than
Jack in Vignette 1 (p = .075), but was viewed as significantly less favorable than Jack in
Vignette 2 (p = .005).
Impression Formation Confidence
No significant differences between the vignettes emerged when analyzing
participants’ judgments of confidence and clarity for their impressions of Jack, F(2,263)
= 1.17, p = .31, meaning that all vignettes were equally clear (or unclear) in their
description of Jack.
Discussion
Participants viewed Jack from Vignettes 1 and 2 similarly across all of the
dimensions (moral judgment, favorability, and impression clarity), and the mean
responses for each of these ratings suggest that, as intended, participants judged Jack as
fairly neutral, but slightly positive in both moral character and favorability. Participants
viewed Jack from Vignette 3 somewhat more neutrally than in Vignettes 1 and 2, but
when rating the morality of Jack’s actions, the average response for participants who read
Vignette 3 fell into the negative range of responses (M = -0.35,SD = 1.51). The goals of
the pretest were to eliminate any vignettes with outright immoral evaluations from being
used in Study 4, so this finding precluded Vignette 3 from being considered as the final
vignette. When comparing Vignettes 1 and 2, these vignettes were statistically similar
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throughout all measures, but Vignette 1 was consistently rated more neutrally (i.e., the
mean responses for all ratings were always slightly closer to the midpoint than for
Vignette 2). For these reasons, I decided to use Vignette 1 in Study 4.
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Appendix F
STUDY 4 GROUP NAME PRETEST
A small pretest was also conducted to choose names for the three groups that
would be used in Study 4. One goal of this pretest was to avoid conveying any moral or
immoral connotations with the group names. A second goal was to select names that
would be distinct and memorable to participants.
Method
Participants
Participants were 12 members (66% female) of the Affect and Cognition social
psychology research lab at UMass Amherst. Participants took this survey through
Qualtrics (an online survey distributor) and were aware of the study goals.
Name Choices
Thirty-eight potential group names were created by the primary investigator and
from soliciting suggestions from lab members in the weeks leading up to the pretest. The
names were nonsense words: Charvens, Lenmens, Watkins, Sanders, Prumbles, Sedlies,
Flepps, Thilps, Cotinks, Gathras, Desnets, Consons, Gaffords, Pojums, Perners, Kiers,
Emples, Thouts, Fultons, Lobos, Bindles, Kooks, Phlobens, Mullors, Sunics, Rulnics,
Wiltons, Abneys, Welches, Mindons, Larches, Vassers, Dubrays, Thaxters, Pliners,
Haplins, Grixies, Murneys.
Name Preferences
Group name preferences were measured by asking participant to select and rank
their top ten group names. Overall preference for a particular group name was considered
by using both the popularity and relative ranking of the name across participants. First, I
sorted by total choice count, computed by summing how many people selected that name
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to be part of their top ten choices. Due to the large number of group name choices, six
group names tied for the highest total choices (with five votes each: Kiers, Charvens,
Gaffords, Watkins, Vassers, and Haplins). After excluding the list to these six choices, I
then computed an average ranking score for each name, by summing the ranking
preferences from all those who selected that name, and then dividing by the number of
people who chose that name. The overall preference for each group name was then
calculated as a ratio of these two scores (Average Preference = Total Ranking/Total
Count). For example, if five people chose the Kiers, and those people ordered that group
name as their first, third, fourth, sixth, and ninth choices, then the total ranking score for
the Kiers name would be 23. For this example, the overall preference score for the Kiers
group name would be 23 divided by 5, or 4.6.
Results and Discussion
Due to the large number of choices, no names gained a clear majority. Six name
choices garnered 5 votes each (see Table 10) and their overall preference scores varied.
The three names with the most vote counts and also the most prioritized average ranking,
were selected for use in Study 4: the Haplins, the Vassers, and the Watkins.
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Table 10. Group name sorted by count, ranking, and average preference.
Total Count

Total Ranking

Average Preference

Haplins

5

14

2.80

Watkins

5

25

5.00

Vassers

5

25

5.00

Gaffords

5

27

5.40

Charvens

5

28

5.60

Kiers

5

32

6.40

Fultons

4

11

2.75

Wiltons

4

13

3.25

Sunics

4

16

4.00

Pliners

4

16

4.00

Murnies

4

20

5.00

Sanders

4

22

5.50

Bindles

4

24

6.00

Emples

4

28

7.00

Thaxters

4

29

7.25

Mindons

3

11

3.67

Kooks

3

13

4.33

Consons

3

17

5.67

Sedlies

3

18

6.00

Desnets

3

18

6.00

!
136!

Table 10. Continued.
Total Count

Total Ranking

Average Preference

Flepps

3

20

6.67

Thilps

3

20

6.67

Thouts

3

24

8.00

Welches

3

24

8.00

Prumbles

2

8

4.00

Abneys

2

8

4.00

Rulnics

2

10

5.00

Larches

2

10

5.00

Lenmens

2

11

5.50

Mullors

1

1

1.00

Dubrays

1

3

3.00

Cotinks

1

4

4.00

Grizies

1

4

4.00

Phlobens

1

5

5.00

Perners

1

10

10.00

Gathras

0

0

0.00

Pojums

0

0

0.00

Lobos

0

0

0.00

!
137!

Appendix G
STUDY 4 PROTOTYPICAL GROUP MEMBER VIGNETTES
Vignettes used in Study 4 to establish group stereotypes, which describe
archetypal members.
Moral Group Members (Vassers)
1) Anna has been a member of the Vassers for 4 years.
Waking up to her alarm, Anna rolled out of bed and started getting ready for the day.
After grabbing some coffee, she drove to her local pharmacy, where she worked as a
pharmacist. Today she was looking forward to training a new pharmacist, Jason, who was
just out of pharmacy school and was looking for some hands on experience. Anna knew
that some people might find her job boring, but she found that she really enjoyed it, and
she particularly appreciated her colleagues. Everyone who worked with her took their job
seriously, but they also seemed to know how to be friendly in the workplace.
After a few hours of work, Anna and another colleague, Tim, took Jason out to lunch, as
they could tell that he was overwhelmed with his first day. During lunch, Jason admitted
he was somewhat worried about how quickly he needed to change focus throughout the
morning, and didn’t know if he would be able to keep up. Anna and Tim tried their best
to reassure him by saying that they also felt that way when just starting out, but that he
would eventually get used to the hectic schedule. Later, after Anna got off work, she went
to a nursing home where she volunteered for a few hours a week. She chatted with some
patients for about an hour, before helping the nursing staff create an organizational layout
for a new pharmaceutical storage area. That night, after returning home and eating dinner,
she put some music on and began to relax from her busy day, and then went straight to
sleep.
2) Patrick has been a member of the Vassers for 8 years.
Patrick woke up late, then ate a leisurely breakfast and read some news online. He
worked as a 5th grade teacher, so he enjoyed the weekend, when he could sleep in. Later
that morning, he went outside to get some yard-work done. While he was mowing his
grass, he listened to music and tried to make the chore more enjoyable. When he was
finished, he realized that his neighbor’s yard could use mowing too. After knocking on
her door and making sure it was okay with her, Patrick ended up mowing Martha’s lawn
that afternoon too. She was retired and seemed to have some trouble getting around, and
he could tell that she really appreciated it. After he finished mowing her lawn, Patrick
went back inside and got cleaned up.
That afternoon, he worked on a budget and a schedule for an upcoming class field trip to
a nearby science museum. Patrick made certain that part of the budget was eating lunch
in the museum’s cafeteria, because he knew that some students in his class wouldn’t have
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lunch on the field trip otherwise. Then he emailed Paula, the other 5th grade teacher, to set
up a meeting about sending the information out to all of the parents about the field trip.
That night he met some friends to go bowling, they had joined a league that usually met
on Thursday nights, but they liked to go and practice some weekends. After saying
goodnight to his friends, he headed home and started getting ready for bed. He fell asleep
quickly that night, because he was so exhausted.
3) Julie has been a member of the Vassers for 11 years.
Julie woke up early that day, and grabbed a quick bowl of cereal for breakfast before
getting ready for the day. She worked at a non-profit agency that worked to improve adult
literacy rates and was eager to head into work because they were finally reaching the end
of an important outreach project. Julie and some colleagues had figured out that the
agency needed to use TV, radio, and video internet ads to reach out to those adults in the
community who couldn’t read. Last week, she and her team had finally finished the ads,
and they had begun airing earlier that week. Julie was hoping that they would start to see
more people coming to the reading center as a result. They had already started to see a
small increase in people coming in over the last few days, so they were already busier
than usual at the reading center.
That day, Julie worked with a few different individuals, and she noticed that they were
making good progress on their reading skills. She ended up staying late that day, so that
he could make some calls to radio stations about when to air the ads in the next few
weeks. Then, Julie went and met some friends, Tina and Emily, for dinner at a local
sports bar. They ordered some wings and then watched the basketball game on TV. After
the game was over, she went home and got ready for bed. She had some trouble falling
asleep because of such an eventful day, but she eventually drifted off to sleep.
4) Joe has been a member of the Vassers for 2 years.
Joe got out of bed as soon as his alarm went off, and started getting ready for the day. He
lived off-campus with a few other roommates, but he had a couple of classes that day so
he packed his bag and went to grab breakfast on campus. After breakfast, Joe made his
way to his first class, sat down and got out his notebook. The lecture was fairly
interesting that day, and they even got to watch a video halfway through, so he felt like
he was having a good start to his day. On his way to the next class, Joe saw a wallet
someone had dropped on the sidewalk. Opening it up, he checked the ID and looked
around to see if he could recognize the person nearby. Not seeing anyone familiar, he
took a short detour to the student center to drop it off at the lost and found, before
continuing on to his next class. Joe made it to class just as the lecture started and was able
to grab a seat in the back of the room.
After class, he met his friend, Brian, at a sandwich place and they made plans to work in
the library after lunch. They walked back to campus and studied for a few hours, before
Joe decided to head to the gym. After his workout, Joe texted his roommates to ask if
they wanted Pizza for dinner. On his way home, he picked up the pizza and then he
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relaxed with his friends by watching some TV. When he started getting tired, he
showered and then went to bed.
5) Eric has been a member of the Vassers for 6 years.
Eric woke up early, got dressed, and then went to meet a friend, Drew, at a diner for
breakfast. They both were volunteer firefighters, and Eric had organized the group to go
build a house that weekend, as part of the habitat for humanity project. After breakfast,
they met the rest of their group at the build site and started getting to work. After a few
hours of working on building the wood frames for the house, Eric had arranged for pizzas
to be delivered for lunch and everyone seemed to be having a good time as they took a
break from the construction. That afternoon went by quickly, and they made good
progress on the house, and Eric enjoyed installing the kitchen cabinets with a few others,
before calling it a day. As everyone started packing the tools away and cleaning up the
build site, Drew asked if anyone was interested in going out for a drink later that night. A
few people said they were too tired, but Kathryn, Pete, and Jacqueline decided to join
Drew and Eric out at the bar.
That night, Eric arrived a little late to the bar. By that time, it was already clear that some
of his friends were going to need help getting home later, so he offered to be the
designated driver so that everyone else could relax and have a good time. Later that night,
after dropping his other friends off at their places, he went home and went to sleep
instantly, because he was tired after all the physical labor of the day.
Immoral Group Members (Haplins)
1) John has been a member of the Haplins for 5 years.
After waking up and getting ready for the day, John headed to the office. He was excited
to be at work that day, because he and a few other colleagues had all worked hard as a
team to finish an advertising project, and they were planning to pitch their idea to their
client. John would be in a good position for a promotion if the meeting with the client
went well, so the night beforehand he had strategized how to take ownership over parts of
the project so that he would stand out to his boss. He knew he would have to be careful in
his approach, because he knew that another member of the project team, Martin, was also
angling for this promotion. During the meeting, he decided to criticize some of Martin’s
contributions and offered his own suggestions. The meeting seemed to go well, so after
work he went out to celebrate with his coworkers. Normally his officemates were pretty
friendly with him, but they all seemed distant that night, so he went home earlier than he
thought he would.
Once he got home, John’s mind drifted back over the events of the day. He mentally
replayed the meeting with the client, and he felt confident that he had made it clear to his
boss that he was the real reason for the success of the project. He was glad that
everything with the client went so well and he thought about how he should approach his
boss to discuss his promotion. After running through a few different ideas about how to
handle the situation, he started to get tired and let himself drift off to sleep.
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2) Sara has been a member of the Haplins for 7 years.
Sara woke up early and went for a jog, before grabbing breakfast and driving into the
office. She worked at a local law firm and planned to meet with a new potential client, a
small business owner, who was being sued for failing to pay workers their overtime
wages. After asking him a few questions about the situation, she was able to determine
that there wasn’t any strong evidence that would implicate him and told him that she
would be in touch about whether or not she would take the case. After lunch, Sara
examined the financial documents the client had brought with him. Even though she
knew that the business owner had set up an illegal pay schedule that was specifically
designed to avoid overtime payment, she felt that she could produce a successful defense
and felt good about taking the case.
After calling the client to confirm their next meeting, she left the office and met her
fiancé for dinner. They spoke for most of the dinner about their plans to look at potential
wedding venues that weekend. When she excused herself to the ladies’ room, she was
checking her makeup and noticed a pendant necklace on the floor. Sara thought the
necklace looked cute, and she didn’t think it looked overly expensive, so she decided to
take it home with her. When she got home from dinner, she sat at her couch and wrote a
few legal briefs that needed to be filed the next day. Exhausted from her long day, she got
into bed and fell asleep as soon as her head hit the pillow.
3) Mike has been a member of the Haplins for 10 years.
Mike took his time waking up that morning, because it was a Saturday, and he didn’t
have to go in and teach high school students all day. He did have some grading to do,
however, because his eleventh-grade class had turned in their 8-page essays that week. In
all, he had about 40 papers to grade that weekend. It was nearing the end of the year, and
he was exhausted from all the work he had been doing lately. After glancing at the pile of
papers, Mike decided to go out and run some errands first.
Once he was back from the grocery store, he finally took a look at the student papers. He
knew his students had worked hard on their papers and deserved quality feedback on
them, but his heart just wasn’t in it. Instead, Mike found himself going through the papers
and making a few comments on each paper, and then giving students grades based on
their previous assignment grades and their class participation. He took particular pleasure
in grading a really annoying student’s, paper fairly low. Mike knew it wasn’t the best
way to grade papers, but he had plans with his family the next day and didn’t have the
time to grade each paper in-depth. When he finished entering the scores into his grade
book, he called his friend, Matt, and invited him out for a few drinks. When he returned
home that night, Mike remembered that he had promised to make potato salad for his
family’s barbecue, so he set his alarm for earlier the next morning.
4) Meredith has been a member of the Haplins for 3 years.
Meredith woke up and made herself her usual breakfast of toast and yogurt, before
getting ready for her classes. After parking in the commuter lot, she arrived early for her
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first class of the day and sat near the back of the classroom, then she studied the flash
cards she made last night. There was an exam that day, and she wasn’t feeling confident
that she would be able to do well. She always felt like she knew the material but couldn’t
remember it all for the tests in this class.
As the professor passed out the exams, she put her notebook and flashcards away, and
slid her bag under her desk. Toward the end of the exam, Meredith realized that she was
completely stumped on the some of the questions, and couldn’t even really make a guess
at some of the answers. She was sitting too far away from other people to even make a
glance at their exams, but then she noticed that her notebook was open to a page of notes
in her backpack, and that she actually had some of the answers that she needed. She filled
in the rest of the answers for her test, and then passed it in. After the test, she headed to a
café for a Frappuccino, and then went to her next class. That night, when Meredith got
home, she thought back to the test she took that day while she made dinner, and hoped
that she got a passing grade. She settled on the couch with some of her roommates for a
movie, before heading to bed.
5) Nick has been a member of the Haplins for 6 years.
That morning, Nick woke up quickly, got dressed for the day, and then grabbed a drivethru breakfast sandwich before heading into work. He worked at a bank, as a mortgage
lender and he usually met with about three to four clients a day. Some days were slower
than others, but today he was fairly busy. Everything went smoothly for the first two
clients of the day, but he eventually had to turn a client down for a mortgage right before
lunch. Nick swung by Jim’s office before lunch, and they both headed out to a burrito
place down the street. After they got their food, Nick and Jim talked about the new guy at
work, Darrell. He was kind of a nerdy guy, who seemed to be obsessed with no one
touching the things on his desk. Nick suggested that they get him to loosen up by playing
a prank on him and Jim thought it sounded good, and so they decided to brainstorm a few
different ideas.
When they got back from the office, Nick saw another client, and then went to the break
room to grab a snack. Later that afternoon, Jim came to Nick’s office to let him know that
Darrell had gone home already, so they went into his office and moved some of his stuff
around. It wasn’t the best prank, but Nick wanted to see how Darrell reacted to a mild
prank before upping the ante. Nick then went home, made himself dinner, and finally
watched some TV before heading to bed.
Control Group Members (Watkins)
1) Greg has been a member of the Watkins for 6 years.
Greg woke up to his alarm, and then got out of bed quickly. Before breakfast, he went for
his daily run, and when he got back he made his usual high protein smoothie. After
showing and getting dressed, he headed in to open up the nutrition store that he owned.
That day they were conducting a store inventory, so he had asked Natalie and Ben to
come in for some overtime hours so that they could help out. As they worked through the
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items in the front of the store, Greg was pretty pleased that his predictions for what items
would sell during the month were fairly close to the actual numbers. After finishing up
the inventory late that afternoon, he decided to call it a day a bit early and headed to the
gym.
Greg was a weight lifter and he had a few friends, Rob and Jake, that would show up at
the same gym and they all would spot each other while lifting. He was planning on going
to a competition later that month, so he was trying to carefully increase the weight he
could lift. Greg was cautious because he was overcoming a knee injury from his time
playing football in college and he didn’t want to overdo it. Rob used to be a personal
trainer, so he was great for knowing how much weight to add at a time. After a good day
at the gym, Greg grabbed a burrito on the way home. Once he got home, he watched a bit
of TV and then went right to bed.
2) Jenna has been a member of the Watkins for 5 years.
After sleeping in, Jenna got out of bed feeling refreshed. She usually woke up to an
alarm, but she had been feeling under the weather lately and didn’t want it to turn into a
full-blown cold, so she figured she could use the extra sleep. After making an omelet for
breakfast, she sat down to complete the newspaper crossword of the day. It was Jenna’s
day off of work, so she had minimal plans for the day other than doing some laundry and
other household chores. As she put some clothes into the wash, she decided that she was
feeling well enough that day to go to her yoga class. After changing into her yoga outfit
and grabbing her mat, she walked to the downtown yoga studio, where she did yoga at
least once a day, if not more.
As she settled into the session, Jenna began feeling more centered and relaxed. She let
her mind sink down and started focusing on the movements and her breathing. At the end
of the session, she was really glad that she decided to come after all because she was
feeling much better. Before heading home, Jenna caught up with a friend, Claire, whom
she hadn’t seen in a few weeks, and made plans to grab dinner with her the next night.
She was looking forward to hearing all about Claire’s vacation to Fiji. When Jenna
arrived home, she put the laundry in the wash, and then did a bit of cleaning up around
her apartment. That night, she got into bed with a book, and read until she fell asleep.
3) Matt has been a member of the Watkins for 9 years.
Getting out of bed, Matt first did his usual morning workout- 30 pushups and 50 sit-ups,
before grabbing some oatmeal for breakfast. After getting dressed, he headed into the
university where he worked as the head soccer coach. His team had a game coming up
later that week, so he wanted to make these next few practices really count. The team
they were playing against was having a strong season, with only one loss, so his team
really needed to be playing at their best to win. The opposing team was particularly
strong at defense, so he wanted to make sure that these next few practices were going to
help the offense on his team. That morning he worked up a few plays that might work
against the other team and decided to run them by the assistant coach, Jerry, after lunch.
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He took a quick lunch break down the street, and then when he got back he went into
Jerry’s office to go over the new plays. Jerry thought they were decent, but he had a few
ideas in mind to make them more effective, so they worked together on them for the rest
of the day, until practice time for the team. The team did a great job putting the plays into
practice, and Matt felt good about their prospects in the upcoming game. That night, after
making himself dinner, Matt watched the video of the practice from that day, so that he
could deliver his feedback to his players for the next practice. After finishing his video
feedback, Matt went to bed.
4) Leslie has been a member of the Watkins for 3 years.
Leslie woke up early, before her alarm could go off. She was excited to get the day
started, because she was starting her new job as a personal trainer. She had worked as a
personal trainer for the year before, but she had just been hired at the nice, new gym in
town that had state-of-the-art facilities. After having breakfast and getting ready for the
day, she headed into the gym and first met with the manager, Tom. Leslie filled out all
her paper work, and then Tom showed her to the trainer’s lounge. She had her own space
where she could meet with clients and discuss their personal routines, in addition to the
large open area where trainers could relax and get to know each other between clients.
She was eager to get to work, and familiarize herself with the layout of the gym and all of
the equipment.
After lunch, Leslie went on a tour of the gym with Tessa, who showed her around and
then had Leslie watch one of her training sessions. Leslie was really looking forward to
having her own clients, and was happy that it seemed like she would be able to start
meeting clients by the end of that week. Leslie grabbed dinner at a restaurant in town
with her friend, Rachel, and they talked all about her first day at the gym. After driving
home, Leslie got into bed, but she had trouble falling asleep because she was excited to
be back at work the next day.
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Appendix H
STUDY 4 IDENTIFICATION BLURBS
The moral and immoral identification blurbs were taken from previous research
(Knutson, et al., 2013, supplemental materials). The control (sporty) identification
vignettes were created for this study.
Instructions to Participants
Now that you have read about these three groups, we would like to see if
you can identify what group people are in based on reading a short
example of their behavior. Last semester, we had participants write stories
about life events, and then we took those stories and shortened them to
describe one event for each person. We are interested in seeing if you can
correctly identify what group, the Vassers, Haplins, or Watkins, to which
these people belong. You will be given 30 short examples in all, once you
have read the short event, please pick what group you think the person
belongs to. After you make your choice, you will be told whether or not
you were correct. Please try to get as many identifications correct as you
can. When you are ready to begin, please press the continue button below.
Moral Group Identification Blurbs
1) "I was riding my bike and passed a Ford truck with the keys in the door. So I went into
the apartment building facing that street and asked the man inside if he had a Ford truck.
He did and he went outside to get the keys out of the car door."
2) "I knew a couple and their child through one of those "save-a-child" foundations. The
family decided to move to California and I knew they were going to have a really hard
time finding work. So I sold a bracelet that I had and sent them the money."
3) "Just a few weeks ago I got a call from my friend's niece. She was living in my town
and having some financial difficulties. I told her that she could come live with me for one
week just until she got her act together."
4) "I was running across the street one time, years ago, and a little old woman fell. She
was carrying groceries and she slipped. I helped her get her bearings back and picked up
the groceries."
5) ”I used to ride the bus everyday to work. One day I noticed a pregnant woman who did
not have a seat. So I took her by the arm and helped her find a seat."
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6) "I was at this festival downtown and there was a man walking along, counting his
money. He had a lot of cash in his hands and dropped a five-dollar bill. I picked it up and
returned it to him."
7) "I bought a pair of shoes and the lady was busy, so she charged me the wrong price for
the shoes. I didn't want to cheat her so asked her if she was sure that this was the right
price for the shoes. It was the wrong price and she corrected the price and thanked me."
8) "My neighbor had a dog for 14 years and one day the dog disappeared. I went around
putting up signs throughout the neighborhood, but when my friend found his dog, it was
sick and needed to be put to sleep. I stayed up all night with him as he cried."
9) "A friend of mine decided to move to the city where I lived. My friend didn't know
anyone in the city. So, I went to pick her up at the airport and drove her around the city
throughout the next week so she could become familiar with the city."
10) “While I was working as the manager of a bar, part of my job was to make deposits in
the bank's night box. One night when I was depositing money, I found someone else's bag
of money. Instead of keeping it, I deposited it for them."
Immoral Group Identification Blurbs
1) "I went to the movies a couple of months ago, to see a film. When that film was done,
instead of leaving the theater, I just went into another of the theaters within the complex.
I watched another movie without paying."
2) "My husband thinks I shop too much. So now when I go shopping I put the items in
the trunk of my car. I take the items out slowly over time, so my husband doesn't find
out."
3) "In high school my friends and I were big shoplifters. Our favorite thing to do after
school was go to a local drugstore and load up on candy bars. We did it quite a few times
and no one ever found out."
4) "Once I was house-sitting and I took a bottle of perfume from under the sink. I think it
belonged to a girl who didn't live there anymore. I didn't think anybody wanted it
anymore because it was underneath the sink."
5) "I took my sister's ring that was given to her by our father's aunt. I had never met our
father's aunt but my sister spent some time with her. I took the ring because I didn't think
that my sister deserved it."
6) "I put a poster that I had on EBay. There was a man who bid on it and paid with a
system that sent the money directly to me. He was kind of a jerk during the whole
transaction, so I decided not to send the poster and just keep the money."
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7) "I lied to a boss once. I said I delivered some paperwork for him that he needed
delivered to complete this deal. He had been unclear in his instructions to me and I just
forgot to send it."
8) "I remember when public transportation buses started charging a dollar per ride. My
friends and I would tear the dollar into 4 pieces and fold it up so it looked like a dollar. I
would use a dollar for four rides."
9) "A little while ago I had to go to the RMV to get my drivers license renewed. They
told me that I had to take a written test in which I had three attempts to pass. I failed the
first two times, so I cheated on the final attempt and passed."
10) "A few years ago I was staying with a friend who lived in a house of a very famous
person. There were many autographed books in the house. I stole one of the books, which
was autographed by a very famous celebrity."
Control (Sporty) Group Identification Blurbs
1) "I had a personal trainer a few years ago that wasn't really getting me to reach my
exercise goals, so I ended up switching to a new person. Although I think that my first
trainer was friendlier, I like the results that my new trainer gets me."
2) "I am on the school swim team, and these past few weeks were really hard because we
were reaching our season's peak distance. I love swimming, but I am looking forward to
next week when we will begin to lessen the distance we swim each practice."
3) "I work part-time at an office, and we don't really do anything together outside of
work. I had found out about an office softball tournament in the area, and now we all get
together a few times a month to play softball."
4)"A couple of weeks ago, I went with a couple of friends to run a marathon. We had
trained together for a few months, so it was really great to cross the finish line. We both
hit our target time, so we think we will sign up for another one soon."
5) "I really enjoy volleyball, but I got injured a year ago and can't play anymore. This
year, I applied for a coaching job at the area high school, and I'm so glad I did. I wasn't
sure what I was going to do after my injury, but I really like teaching the high schoolers
how to play together as a team."
6) "Last week I finally bought myself a new bike. I bike into work and I also like to take
long bike rides on the weekend. I've always bought used bikes, so I was excited to get my
first new bike for myself and pick out all the special features that I wanted for it."
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Appendix I
STUDY 4 METHOD AND RESULTS (INCLUDING SAD CONDITION)
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were recruited from psychology courses (292 total participants) and
participated in exchange for course extra credit points. Participants first completed the
group stereotype training (described in the group stereotype pilot study) by reading about
the group information and then completing the identification task. Next, they then
completed a distractor task where they colored for 4 minutes to repair their mood and
allow their cognitive baseline to settle after the group stereotype training. After this
distractor, participants were primed with an either global or local processing style
through the map task (identical to the one used in Study 3B) and then watched a video
clip that induced either happiness, sadness, or disgust. After these processing prime and
affect manipulations, participants then read a story about the target individual (Jack),
where global trait information was provided (through Jack’s membership in either the
moral group or immoral group) as well as local behavioral information was provided
(which were morally ambiguous behaviors). Next, participants answered questions about
the impression that they formed of the target, including moral judgments and general
evaluations (such as favorability). Finally, participants then answered an affective
manipulation check questionnaire and a short demographics questionnaire. They were
randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions in a 3 (happy v. sad v. disgust) x 2 (global v.
local) x 2 (moral v. immoral stereotype) between-subjects factorial design.
Some participants were excluded from the analysis because of failing
manipulation checks. Twenty-three participants were excluded for scoring less than 85%
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correct on the processing style manipulation. I also followed existing protocols for
excluding participants with non-standard responses to affective manipulations (e.g.,
Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Schnall, et al., 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), and
31 participants who were more than three boxplot lengths away from the average
affective responses to the videos (and therefore considered statistical outliers) were
excluded from the analysis. Finally, 20 participants were also excluded because they
participated in the vignette pretest (and I had no a priori method of preventing their
subsequent participation in this study). A multi-way frequency analysis showed no
relationship between the experimental conditions and exclusions from the analysis,
Pearson Chi-sqaure (12) = 2.03, p = .999. Of the remaining 230 participants (80.9%
female), the average age is 20.01 years (SD = 1.78), and 75.2% are Caucasian, 3% are
African-American, 13.9% are Asian, 2.6% are Hispanic, 3.5% are of mixed race, and
1.7% chose not to report their race.
Tasks and Manipulations
Group stereotype training. Participants followed the same instructions as those
used in the group stereotype pilot study described earlier, and then read vignettes
describing 4 individuals from the moral group (the Vassers), the immoral group (the
Haplins), and the control sporty group (the Watkins). The groups were presented as
blocks, but their presentation order and the presentation order of the individuals within
groups were both randomized.
Identification Task. Next, participants completed the same identification task
from the pilot study, where they read 26 short identification blurbs, chose what group the
individual belonged to, and then received feedback about their performance on each item.
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Distractor Task. Participants then completed a coloring-based distraction task
(also used in the pilot study), in which they were given 10 crayons of varying colors and
a blank piece of paper upon which to draw. This task served to help the group stereotype
information settle, and also to restore the participant’s affective and cognitive baseline
which could have depleted during the previous tasks.
Processing Style Manipulation. Participants then completed the identical map
task to the one that was used in Study 3B (adapted from Förster, et al., 2008, see Figure
1). Participants in the local condition were instructed to focus on the cities within the
state, whereas those in the global condition were instructed to focus on the shape of the
state.
Affect Manipulation. After the processing prime manipulation, participants
watched one of two video clips to induce happiness (a clip from The Simpsons; Isbell,
McCabe, Burns, & Lair, 2013), sadness (a scene from One True Thing, Isbell et al.,
2013), or disgust (a scene from Train Spotting used in Schnall et al., 2008).
Impression Formation Vignette. Participants then read a story about an
individual, named Jack, who engaged in a series of morally ambiguous behaviors (see
Appendix J) with the following instructions: “Please read all of the information below
and form an impression of the character (Jack) in the story. After doing so, you will be
asked some questions about the impression that you formed of Jack.”
Global Trait Information. In the beginning of the impression formation vignette,
half of the participants were told that Jack was a member of the Haplins (immoral group)
and the other half were told that Jack was a member of the Vassers. A small logo for the
group was also included in the top right corner of the first page of the vignette so that
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participants would be able to visually remember to what group Jack belonged (see Figure
11).
Moral Impression Formations
Person-based judgments. Participants answered three questions to assess their
moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person, which included whether they thought he was
moral or immoral, morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very
immoral/morally wrong/bad to +50 Very moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α =
.904).
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral,
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α =
.930).
Moral thermometer ratings. They also assessed jack on a “Moral
Thermometer”, where scores between 0 and 49 indicate that Jack is an immoral person,
or someone who usually does the wrong thing and scores between 51 and 100 indicate
that Jack is a moral person, or someone who usually does the right thing.
Target Favorability Ratings
Then, identical to the procedure in Study 3B, participants rated Jack on the feeling
thermometer. Next, participants answered the overall favorability items used in Study 3B
(judging how favorable, likable, positive Jack was). After standardizing these four items,
I averaged them to create a composite favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .935).
Target Trait Ratings
Participants rated the extent to which Jack exhibited good (average of friendly,
sincere, trustworthy, warm, generous, honest, helpful, and conscientious; Cronbach’s α =
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.893) or bad personality traits (average of deceitful, mean, hostile, cruel, cold, arrogant,
calculating, thoughtless, and selfish; Cronbach’s α = .832) on a 11-point scale (from 0Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-Extremely). These traits were similar to those used for Study
3B, but instead included moral traits, as opposed to sociability traits (which were the
focus of Study 3B).
Impression Formation Process
Amount of information used for impression formation. Also identical to Study
3B procedure, participants next answered a question asking how much information they
considered when forming their impression.
Impression clarity. Then participants answered two questions (also from Study
3B) about the clarity and ease with which they formed their impression (Cronbach’s α =
.617).
Manipulation Checks
Global trait stereotypic information manipulation check. Participants were
then asked two items about Jack’s group membership, the first was a free-response
answer where they were asked to name the group that Jack belonged to, and the following
item was the same question, but with multiple-choice answers of the group names. Recall
was very high, with 95.7% (n = 220) of the final sample remembering Jack’s group
membership (close alternative spellings of group names in the free response were coded
as correct).
Affect manipulation check. Participants were asked to what extent they felt
various emotions while they were watching the video (i.e., sad, happy, disgusted, angry,
certain of their beliefs, upset, anxious, confident, tense, grossed out, tense, queasy,
observant, bored, tired, calm, confused, sickened, distracted, afraid, thoughtless, amused)
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on a 7-point scale (from 1-Not at all, to 7-Very Much). Responses were averaged together
to create emotion composite scores: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α = .829), sad and
upset (Cronbach’s α =.828), disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out (Cronbach’s α
= .963), and tense, anxious, and afraid (Cronbach’s α = .793). Anger was analyzed as a
one-item measure.
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. Participants then
answered three questions each about the Vassers, Haplins, and Watkins groups to assess
their moral judgments about those groups. These three items were identical to those used
in the group stereotype training pilot study, and composite items were created from all
three judgments for each group (Vassers: Cronbach’s α = .940, Haplins: Cronbach’s α =
.972, Watkins: Cronbach’s α = .947).
Participants then completed a basic demographics questionnaire, which asked
them to report their age, gender, and race.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Affect manipulation. Participants in the happy video condition reported feeling
significantly more happiness than those in the disgust condition, as revealed by a 2
(happy score v. disgust score) x 2 (happy video v. disgust video) x 2 (global v. local) x 2
(moral vs. immoral group stereotype) mixed ANOVA. An expected 2-way interaction
between reported affect and the affect condition shows that the videos were successful at
manipulating affect, F(2,218) = 120.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .525. The pattern of results is in
the expected direction, such that those in the happy condition reported significantly more
happiness (M = 4.49, SD = 1.60) than disgust (M = 1.47, SD = 0.61; t(71) = 13.65, p <
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.69), or sadness (M = 1.60, SD = 0.81; t(71) = 12.45, p < .001,
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Cohen’s d =1.377. Likewise, those in the disgust condition reported significantly more
disgust (M = 5.79, SD = 1.15) than happiness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.00; t(76) = 20.68, p <
.001, Cohen’s d = 2.37) and sadness (M = 2.32, SD = 1.27; t(76) = 21.68, p < .001,
Cohen’s d =1.926. Finally, those in the sad condition also reported feeling significantly
more sadness (M = 5.35, SD = 1.36) than happiness (M = 1.36, SD = 0.55; t(71) = 13.65,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.602) or disgust (M = 1.95, SD = 1.04; t(80) = 20.14, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 2.270).
Bonferonni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that those in the disgust condition did
report feeling slightly more anger, sadness, and anxiety than those in the happy condition,
(all ps < .019). All participants, regardless of condition, reported feeling significantly
more of their target emotion than anger or anxiety (all ps < .001).
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. The group stereotype
training was successful. A significant main effect of group type revealed responses in the
expected direction, F(2,436) = 382.19 p < .001, ηp2 = .637. Participants viewed the moral
group as more moral (M = 9.54, SD = 2.33) than immoral group (M = 3.45, SD = 2.27;
t(229) = 22.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.495) and the control group (M = 7.36, SD = 1.68;
t(229) = 11.38, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.757). They also viewed the immoral group as more
immoral than the control group (t(229) = -19.22, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.278).
Moral Judgments
Action- versus person-based judgments. I compared participants’ judgments of
the target “as a person” to their judgments of the target’s actions. Person-based judgments
and action-based moral judgments differed overall, with participants judging the target’s
actions slightly more severely (M = -.85, SD = 1.36) than Jack as a person (M = -.45 SD =
1.55; F(1,218) = 53.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .197). There was also an interaction between
!
154!

person-based and action-based judgments and Jack’s group membership, F(1,218) = 4.50,
p = .035, ηp2 = .020. This was in the expected direction, such that when Jack belonged to
the immoral (vs. moral) group he was judged more severely for both person-based
judgments (immoral group: M = -.73, SD = 1.59; moral group: M = -.17, SD = 1.45), and
action-based judgments (immoral group: M = -1.04, SD = 1.44; moral group: M = -.66,
SD = 1.25). Aside from these two effects, differences between person-based and actionbased judgments varied as a function of processing style and emotional manipulation,
F(2,218) = 3.92, p = .021, ηp2 = .035. The results for the disgust and happy conditions
support the cognitive malleability account, as those processing globally (global + happy
and local + disgust conditions) were more likely to incorporate the target’s actions into
their overall impression of him as a person (see Table 11). In contrast, those processing
locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions) were more likely to judge the
target and their actions differently, particularly by judging the person less severely than
the person’s actions. Those in the sad condition, however, always judged Jack’s actions
more severely than Jack, as a person (see Table 11), regardless of processing prime.
Notably, participants in the disgust condition were not significantly more punitive in their
judgments of the target or his actions when compared to those in the happy condition
(within-subjects interaction: F(1,141) = 1.76, p = .187; between-subjects main effect:
F(1,141) = .171, p = .680).
Moral thermometer ratings. Analyzing participant’s ratings of Jack on a moral
thermometer revealed a significant main effect in the expected direction for Jack’s
membership in either a moral group (M = 48.94, SD = 14.87) or immoral group (M =
43.37, SD = 15.10), F(1,218) = 8.30, p = .004, ηp2 = .037. Moral thermometer ratings of
Jack also marginally varied as a function of processing prime, emotional manipulation,
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and group stereotype information, F(2,218) = 2.58, p = .078. Again, the happy and
disgust conditions support the cognitive malleability account, such that those processing
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) relied more on Jack’s group
membership information when forming their moral impression of him, as compared to
those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions). Those in the sad
condition, however, relied on Jack’s group membership, and judged Jack in the immoral
group (MGlobal = 42.05, SD = 10.60 vs. MLocal = 41.25, SD = 17.40) more harshly than
Jack in the moral group (MGlobal = 48.53, SD = 13.72 vs. MLocal = 46.28, SD = 19.42),
regardless of processing prime.
Target Favorability Ratings
Favorability ratings only varied as a function of Jack’s group membership,
F(2,218) = 8.20, p = .005, ηp2 = .036. Participants’ favorability ratings of Jack varied in
the expected manner, such that when Jack belonged to the moral group he was viewed
more favorably (M = .16, SD = .89), as compared to when Jack belonged to the immoral
group (M = -.16, SD = .91). No other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps
> .070.
Target Trait Judgments
Analyzing participants’ target trait ratings on good and bad personality traits, only
Jack’s group membership influenced the differences between these two judgments,
F(1,218) = 11.63, p = .001, ηp2 = .051. These differences show that when Jack was in the
immoral group, participants endorsed more bad traits for him (M = 4.29, SD = 1.56) than
good traits (M = 3.53, SD = 1.49, t(72) = -3.22, p = .002, Cohen’s d = -.294). This
essentially demonstrates that the immoral group membership information successfully
manipulated beliefs about whether the target was a good or a bad person. A different
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pattern emerged, however, when Jack was in the moral group, such that participants
equally endorsed good traits (M = 4.21, SD = 1.47) and bad traits (M = 3.88, SD = 1.44,;
t(116) = 1.42, p = .159).
Impression Formation Process
Jack’s group membership significantly influenced the amount of information used
in forming participant’s impressions, F(1,218) = 6.81, p = .010, ηp2 = .030, such that
participants reported using slightly more information when forming an impression of
Jack when he belonged to the moral group (M = 3.37, SD = .55), as compared to when
Jack belonged to the immoral group (M = 3.14, SD = .76). No other main effects or
interactions emerged for the amount of information used in forming their impression, (all
Fs < 1.18). In contrast, no differences emerged for the clarity of the participant’s
impression (all Fs < 1.63).
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Table 11. Within-subjects person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function
of processing style and emotional manipulation.
Global Processing Prime
Person Judgments

Action Judgments

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Video

-.75

1.29

-.82

.95

Sad Video

-.60

1.33

-1.03

1.27

Disgust Video

-.25

1.73

-.82

1.60

Local Processing Prime
Person Judgments

Action Judgments

M

SD

M

SD

Happy Video

-.03

1.57

-.48

1.33

Sad Video

-.47

1.71

-1.04

1.49

Disgust Video

-.66

1.56

-.92

1.36
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Appendix J
VIGNETTES USED IN STUDY 4 VIGNETTE PRETEST
Jack Pretest Vignette 1 (this version used in main Study 4)
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his
house. He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work. While Jack was waiting
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any
of his business, and continued on his way to work.
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses,
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him.
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack
a lunch, so he invited Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the street. Jack
ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, but the waitress accidentally brought him a
turkey club. He was disappointed, even though he didn’t say anything to her about it.
Andrew and he chatted about the upcoming softball tournament that their office
participated in, but then their conversation switched to complaining about their boss.
When the lunch check came, Jack tipped a little less than usual because the waitress had
screwed up his order.
When they got back to the office, Jack saw that people were heading over to the
break room, and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for
Kathryn, another co-worker. He grabbed the birthday card that he had brought for her off
of his desk, and got to the break room just in time to sing the “Happy Birthday” song
with everyone. He had just received the last piece of cake when Laura, another
officemate, arrived to the party. He thought about offering to share with her, but
remembered that she was a picky eater and probably didn’t want the cake anyway. After
the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some more work done before the end of
the day. By the time he left the office and made it to the highway, it was already rush
hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could speed on to make it home quicker.
Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular route around his
neighborhood. He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his thoughts and let
the worries of his day fade away. After getting home and showering, he made himself
dinner and sorted through his mail. After dinner, his brother called his cell phone, but
Jack decided he didn’t feel like talking to him and let it go to voicemail.
After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up,
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own
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dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about
dinner plans for the next night and then Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested
to start another day at work.
Jack Pretest Vignette 2
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his
house. He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work. While Jack was waiting
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any
of his business, and continued on his way to work.
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses,
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him.
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack
a lunch, so he invited Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the street. Jack
was glad he was able to invite Andrew without Chris overhearing, because he didn’t
really like Chris, who often tagged along uninvited. When they arrived at the diner, Jack
ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, and then he chatted with Andrew about the
upcoming softball tournament that their office participated in. They spent the rest of the
lunch complaining about their boss, before paying and heading back to the office.
When they returned, Jack saw that people were heading over to the break room,
and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for Kathryn,
another co-worker. He had just received the last piece of cake when Laura, another
officemate, arrived to the party. He thought about offering to share with her, but
remembered that she was a picky eater and probably didn’t want the cake anyway. After
the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some more work done before the end of
the day. By the time he left the office and made it to the highway, it was already rush
hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could speed on to make it home quicker.
Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular route around his
neighborhood. He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his thoughts and let
the worries of his day fade away. On the way back to his house, he said hello to his
neighbor, Dan, who asked to borrow his ladder and he was happy to help. After getting
home and showering, he made himself dinner and sorted through his mail. During dinner,
he noticed the library book sitting on his kitchen table that he was supposed to return last
Friday, but put it out of his mind because he didn’t need more things to do.
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After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up,
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own
dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about
dinner plans for the next night and then Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested
to start another day at work.
Jack Pretest Vignette 3
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his
house. He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work. While Jack was waiting
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any
of his business, and continued on his way to work.
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses,
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him.
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack
a lunch, so he decided to invite Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the
street. On his way to Andrew’s office, he heard Rebecca and Will talking in hushed
voices. The conversation sounded personal, like they had started dating or something, so
he listened for a minute or two before moving along to Andrew’s office. When they
arrived at the diner, Jack ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, and then he chatted
with Andrew about the upcoming softball tournament that their office participated in.
They spent the rest of the lunch complaining about their boss before paying and going
back to the office.
When they returned, Jack saw that people were heading over to the break room,
and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for Kathryn,
another co-worker. As he began eating some cake, he realized that he hadn’t contributed
any money to the office party fund that month, but figured nobody noticed and he was
fine to eat the cake anyway. After the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some
more work done before the end of the day. By the time he left the office and made it to
the highway, it was already rush hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could
speed on to make it home quicker. Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular
route around his neighborhood. He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his
thoughts and let the worries of his day fade away. After getting home and showering, he
made himself dinner and sorted through his mail. After dinner, his brother called his cell
phone, but Jack decided he didn’t feel like talking to him and let it go to voicemail.
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After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up,
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own
dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about
dinner plans for the next night, whom he was taking out to dinner to celebrate his
promotion at work. Then, Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested to start
another day at work.
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